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1 | Introduction
Young people in Spain are still enduring the effects of the ongoing economic recession, with
the most recent unemployment rate at 42% among people below 25 and 17% among people
over 25 (3rd trimester of 2016, INE, 2016b). This is a very large proportion of the young
population, and it could have detrimental effects on society as a whole. We study this in
more detail with three new lines of research. Starting at the very first stage of their labour
market experience, we analyze students’ job preferences in a more quantitative and rigorous
way. This is, what job characteristics young people look for when entering the labour
market. Secondly, we study the effect of political ideology on their distributive preferences
and if this effect differs with economic status, i.e., if they are students, unemployed or
employed. Lastly, we examine the effect of the economic recession on the non-financial
work commitment by level of education, exploring which factors are important.
Therefore, in Chapter 2, we study students’ job preferences, something that is very
important to be aware of. This is clearly important for companies, so that they can try to
adapt and therefore attract the best candidates, for policymakers, so they can help match
new job-seekers to jobs, but it is also important for the students themselves. Butler, Sanders
and Whitecotton (2000) show that students are not good judges of what job characteristics
are important to them, and when asked to rank or rate job attributes, they often misjudge
the importance of the attribute when looked at independently. When asked to evaluate
job opportunities, which include various job characteristics (or attributes) together, the
weights on the job characteristics are different from simple ranking or rating methods.
We elicited job preferences using a discrete choice experiment (DCE), a more quantita-
tive and rigorous method than had been previously used. The DCE’s that have been used
to study job preferences, have mostly been in the health field, but not among students. For
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example, finding ways how to attract doctors or nurses to more rural areas. Nevertheless,
one study using a DCE to study job preferences was conducted among students, namely,
nursing students in South Africa. Given that we are analyzing business and economic stu-
dents in European countries, we expect to find different results. Typically used in the fields
of health, marketing, transportation and environmental economics, a DCE is a stated pref-
erences method which takes into account the multidimensional nature of choosing between
various options.
We conducted the DCE among 3rd or 4th business and economics students at five uni-
versities in three countries: Spain, the Czech Republic and Germany. We chose these
countries so that we could analyze the similarities and differences between students from
different cultures. Furthermore, these countries also differ greatly with respect to the un-
employment rate; Spain is the highest with an unemployment rate of 20.1% (OECD, 2016),
while it is very low for both Germany and the Czech Republic: 4.3% and 4.1% (OECD,
2016), respectively. In Spain, we conducted the survey at a public and a private university
in the Basque Country, and at a public university in the region of Asturias. In the Czech
Republic, it was done at a public university, and in Germany at a private university.
In Chapter 3, we analyze the effect of political ideology on distributive preferences and
how it relates to economic status. In the literature, ideology has been studied by using
surveys and experimental data (Barr, Burns, Miller & Shaw, 2015; Barr, Miller & Ubeda,
2016; Margalit, 2013; Owens & Pedulla, 2014). However, in studies using surveys, ideology
has been estimated jointly with economic status, and experimental studies have largely
ignored the effect of ideology. Therefore, we explicitly tested for political ideology using an
experiment. Then, we examined the effect by economic status, which is divided into three
categories: students, unemployed and employed participants.
We conducted the experiment among young people in Bilbao, the north of Spain, and
in Cordoba, the south of Spain. This was done since many parts of Spain have different
cultural values, as well as different unemployment rates. The experiment had two parts.
The first part consisted of a real-effort task in which participants had to either fill or empty
little pots with yellow and blue gravel. The second part of the experiment was a four-person
dictator game, in which participants received a tray with four quadrants, each quadrant
10
corresponding to a group member.
The experiment had two treatments. In the earned treatment, the initial endowment
was linked to the participant’s performance in the real-effort task. In the random treatment,
the initial endowments were determined randomly, thus, the two parts of the experiment
were not connected in any way.
At the end of the experiment, the participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire
which included questions on their socio-demographic, self-reported health and economic
status. The political ideology question we used in our analysis appeared in the questionnaire
with a left-right axis, going from one (left) to ten (right), and read: When people talk about
politics, the terms left and right are usually used. Below there is a left-right axis. Where
would you place yourself on this axis? Indicate it with an X.
Using a regression model, based on Barr et al. (2015) and Barr et al. (2016), we
estimated the acknowledgement of earned entitlement, i.e., acknowledgement that a person
can keep his/her earnings gained through effort.
In Chapter 4, we analyze the non-financial work commitment among the youth in Spain.
In the literature, this has been measured using the so-called “lottery question”, which asks:
If you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the rest of
your life, would you continue to work? This has been studied in seven countries, all known
for their high work ethics: the United States, the UK, Japan, Israel, Germany, Belgium
and the Netherlands. Approximately 70–90% of participants have said they would continue
working, implying that there is something more to working other than the salary.
To the best of our knowledge, we are contributing by studying the results in a Southern
European country for the first time. Since Spain was greatly affected by the most recent
economic recession, we analyze the non-financial work commitment in 2008, at the begin-
ning of the economic recession, and in 2011, three years into the recession. It is not clear
what effect a recession has on the non-financial commitment to work, also referred to as
the willingness to continue working in our study. Do people feel stressed and demotivated
because there are fewer jobs and therefore are less willing to continue working? Or perhaps
they feel that having a job is necessary in tough economic times and are more willing to
continue working. This effect has not yet been studied in great detail. Additionally, we
11
study this effect by level of education, as we are likely to get different results.
The data used in this chapter was taken from the survey study Observatory of Young
People’s Transition to the Labour Market conducted by the Valencian Institute of Economic
Research. They targeted young people who were searching for work, or who had found their
first job in the last five years. The specific “lottery question” asked in our study was: If
I won the lottery where I wouldn’t have to work for the rest of my life, I would not work.
Respondents were provided with five possible answers: Very much disagree, or, in other
words, would continue working, Disagree, Indifferent, Agree and Very much agree, or would
not continue working. Since there is a natural rank to the answers, we estimated an ordered
logit model. Then, we calculated the predicted probabilities, looking at the most important
factors affecting the non-financial work commitment.
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we analyze young people’s
job preferences when about to enter the labour market. In Chapter 3, we study the effect of
ideology on distributive preferences and how it relates to economic status, and in Chapter
4, we examine the effect of the economic recession on young people’s willingness to work.
Lastly, we conclude with Chapter 5, which summarizes each of the chapters, as well as the
thesis as a whole.
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2 | Job Preferences of Business and Eco-
nomics Students: A Discrete Choice
Experiment
2.1 Motivation
Students’ job preferences are important to analyze, not only for the sake of the companies,
or the policymakers, but for the students themselves. Most of the studies in the literature
have been conducted in the business and accounting field and are not very quantitative.
Main methodologies used to analyze students’ job preferences have been ranking or rating
job attributes. Ranking refers to arranging various attributes in order of preference, while
the rating method asks respondents to evaluate attributes independently, by claiming if
the attribute is important for them, or not. In this paper, we argue that using a DCE is a
more appropriate methodology to study job preferences; however, before looking at DCE’s
in more detail, we review the studies that have been done thus far.
Firstly, focusing on ranking methods, Iacovou, Shirland and Thompson (2011) analyzed
the job preferences of undergraduate business and MBA students at a public university in
the United States. The 241 respondents were asked to evaluate 20 job attributes by com-
paring three attributes at a time, ranking them in order of importance. They found that
growth potential was the most important attribute for the students, followed by a benefits
package, job responsibility, job variety or complexity, and work flexibility. Turban, Eyring
and Campion (1993) also used the ranking method, analyzing preferences of chemical engi-
neering students. They asked students applying for jobs at a large petrochemical company
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to complete a questionnaire. Respondents were asked to rank 11 attributes and those who
were offered a job were asked to fill out a second questionnaire ranking the same attributes
in terms of what was the most important concerning their decision to accept or reject the
job offer. The most important attribute found was the type of work, followed by advance-
ment opportunities. The results from the second questionnaire showed that preferences
differed between applicants who accepted or rejected the job.
Rating methods are more common than ranking in the literature. Bundy and Norris
(1992) studied the job preferences of upper-level accounting students. Their respondents
were asked to rate 35 job attributes using a five-point Likert scale from 1, “not important”,
to 5, “extremely important”. The most important attribute was job security, followed
by if it is challenging and interesting work, advancement potential, employer-paid health
insurance and the personalities of supervisors and co-workers. Similarly, Judge and Bretz
(1992) asked students who were job-searching to rate five job attributes on a scale of one
to five and found that organizational work values affected job decisions. Phillips, Phillips
and Cappel (1994) used a seven-point Likert scale on the importance of 23 job attributes
for students and found that the opportunity for advancement, job security and a good
retirement plan were the three most important attributes.
Some researchers have used the rating method to analyze students’ job preferences, as
well as adding a new component. For example, Boswell, Roehling, LePine and Moynihan
(2003) wanted to understand how students chose their jobs when entering the labour market
and the role of effective and ineffective recruiting practices. Students rated the importance
of 14 job attributes on a Likert scale of one to seven. Company culture, advancement
opportunities and the nature of the work (whether it is challenging, etc.) were rated
as the top three. In addition, students claimed that how they were treated during the
recruitment process was also important for their job choice. Carcello, Copeland, Hermanson
and Turner (1991) analyzed the differences in job expectations of accounting students and
actual work experiences of accounting staff. Both students and accounting staff rated their
agreement to various questions, on a five-point Likert scale, and then the means were
compared. The difference between the expectations of students and the expectations of
staff differed for many questions, suggesting that work experience affects your expectations,
14
perhaps giving one a more realistic perspective. Browne (1997) expanded out of the US,
comparing gender and country differences of work attitudes among business students. She
did this using undergraduate and MBA students from the US and Australia. Students
rated the importance of seven job attributes on a seven-point scale. To have interesting
and challenging work was found to be the most important, then salary. Although no gender
differences were found, there were differences in work attitudes between the two countries,
with a greater emphasis placed on achievement through work by Americans.
Studies on job preferences have also been conducted outside of English-speaking coun-
tries. Chan and Ho (2000) conducted a study in Hong Kong, where final-year account-
ing students rated 30 job attributes on a scale from one to five. The office atmosphere,
friendliness of staff and the opportunity for advancement were found to be the three most
important attributes. In Singapore, Ang Teo and Teng Fatt Poon (1994) analyze under-
graduates’ perceptions of small and large organizations and their respective preferences.
Students first rated what they thought working for a small and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) or for a multinational corporation (MNC) would be like. Then, they ranked their
preference for working for an SME, MNC, their own business or the government. SME’s
were rated less favourably, and most students preferred to work for MNC’s. Lim and Soon
(2006) researched job preferences of final year economics students in Malaysia. Students
were asked to rate seven job selection criteria from 1, “not prefer”, to 9, “prefer most”.
Long-term career prospect was found to be the most important job selection criterion.
Job security was the second most important, followed by working environment and only
then, salary. The applicability of university degree studied was not very important to the
students, but job sector preferences did affect the importance of job selection criteria. Ad-
ditionally, they also found that gender and ethnicity had a large effect on job preferences,
but academic attainment did not.
Rating or a ranking methods might not provide us with the most accurate results. First
of all, when job applicants look for jobs, they, generally, look at the whole combination of
attributes that comes with the job, perhaps unknowingly evaluating each attribute indi-
vidually. Thus, listing attributes and asking students to rank the importance of each one
independently might not result in an accurate reflection of their true preferences in these
15
situations. Second of all, simply listing the attribute, such as “nature of work” or “job
complexity” are very subjective. Telling companies that students think either of these two
attributes are important does not really help them in getting a concrete idea of students’
preferences. Using attribute levels, on the other hand, give a better picture; for exam-
ple, high opportunity for advancement versus low opportunity for advancement. Butler,
Sanders and Whitecotton (2000) tested just that, asking whether students and recruiters
have good self-insight. They used two methods to estimate the preferences of students’ job
attributes; first, respondents were asked to rate attributes individually and second, they
were asked to rate job opportunities, which grouped all attributes together, assigning a
level to each attribute. Their results showed that the difference in importance in the two
methods was statistically significant, indicating that students are not good judges of what
attributes they find important. Moreover, the results show that recruiters do not have
a very good idea of students’ preferences, overemphasizing the importance of firm type
(private/public) and underemphasizing the importance of compensation to students.
Similar to Butler et al. (2000), McGinty and Reitsch (1992) combined five attributes,
and their levels, for 48 job descriptions, which each student was asked to rate. They found
that location was the most important, followed by advancement, social responsibility, inter-
esting job, and salary. However, their sample size was quite small, composed of 10 students.
Montgomery and Ramus (2007) also used a different methodology to individual attribute
rating or ranking, namely, conjoint analysis using 14 attributes. Students from eight busi-
ness schools in North America and three business schools in Europe (France, Switzerland
and the UK), chose between computer-generated sets of choices of job attributes, either two
or three at a time. They found that intellectual challenge is the most important attribute,
approximately 25% greater than the financial package. Conjoint analysis, nevertheless, is
based on the theory of “Conjoint Measurement”, not a behaviour theory, whereas DCE’s,
also a stated preference elicitation method, are based on the random utility theory (RUT)
which takes into account choice behaviour (Louviere, Flynn & Carson, 2010).
We use a DCE to elicit students’ job preferences, a methodology that is more rigorous
than simple rating or ranking methods, and is based on human behaviour. Usually applied
in the fields of health, transportation, marketing and environmental economics, it is easily
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extended to the study of job preferences. This methodology takes into account the multidi-
mensional nature of choosing between different job offers. The DCE in our case, allows us
to portray hypothetical jobs in terms of specific levels of attributes, similar to a real-world
scenario. Each student chooses one out of three hypothetical job alternatives ten times,
allowing us to estimate which attributes are more important than others. Thus, a DCE is
an appropriate valuation method to study students’ job preferences.
To the best of our knowledge, only one DCE has been conducted on students’ job
preferences. Lagarde and Blaauw (2016) examined the factors that attract nursing students
to certain positions in South Africa. Each student had to choose between four hypothetical
job opportunities: a nursing job in the public sector in a rural area, a public job in an
urban area, a private nursing job and a job overseas. Five attributes were included for
each hypothetical job alternative, with a maximum of two levels for each attribute: salary,
type of facility (hospital/clinic), training opportunities, working conditions (eg. if there is
a lack of basic equipment, if the management is supportive) and the social impact (eg. if
you will help provide good quality care to the local population). Students were presented
with 12 choice sets and were asked to rank the four jobs. They found that students valued
salaries differently across the four job opportunities, but generally, expected higher salaries
overseas or in rural areas, and the most important attribute, the highest willingness to pay
(WTP), was for better working conditions.
Lagarde and Blaauw’s (2016) study is very specific to nursing students, and was con-
ducted in an African country. However, we are interested in business or economic students’
job preferences in European countries. Other studies that have focused on job preferences
using DCE’s, but not among students, have been conducted in the health field, some in
developed countries and others in developing countries. In both cases, the objective was
to try and find a way to attract doctors or nurses to areas with medical staff shortages.
Kolstad (2011) studied how to incentivize Tanzanian clinical officers to move to rural areas.
Conducting a DCE, she found that offering continuing education, increased salaries and
hardship allowances were the most powerful recruitment instruments. Similarly, Hanson
and Jack (2008) looked at how to get doctors and nurses in Ethiopia to accept jobs in rural
areas. Doubling wages increased the willingness to work in rural areas the most, while the
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most effective non-wage attribute was improving the quality of the equipment and drugs.
Since the National Health Service in Scotland was going to change consultants’ contracts,
Ubach, Scott, French, Awramenko and Needham (2003) looked into different job aspects
that hospital consultants preferred. Their DCE results showed that being on-call was the
most important attribute which corresponded to a higher income.
Many studies using DCE’s have also been used to compare job preferences between
two groups. For example, Lanfranchi, Narcy and Larguem (2009) studied the attributes
that are important for job-seekers, specifically comparing for-profit workers with nonprofit
workers. They found that nonprofit workers have a higher intrinsic motivation for work
than for-profit workers, since they are willing to work for longer periods of time for lower
wages. For-profit workers, on the other hand, value job offers where higher effort is ex-
changed for employer’s loyalty. Scott (2001) evaluated General Practitioners’ preferences,
comparing two types of job characteristics: pecuniary and non-pecuniary. He concluded
that both types were important, specifically out of hours work commitments among the
non-pecuniary job characteristics. However, once again, these studies did not analyze stu-
dents’ job preferences.
We conducted a DCE among students in public and private universities in Spain, the
Czech Republic and Germany. These countries were chosen because we wanted to compare
different countries in Europe with distinct cultures, to see if the results captured any
differences. Moreover, these countries also differ in terms of labour market conditions;
Spain has a very high unemployment rate of 20.1% (OECD, 2016), while Germany and
the Czech Republic have very low unemployment rates at 4.3% and 4.1% (OECD, 2016),
respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we detail the methodology,
then in Section 3, we present the results. Lastly, in Section 4, we conclude with a discussion.
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2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 DCE’s: An Introduction
We are interested in studying what job characteristics students look for when they are
about to enter the labour market, which is why we use a stated preference method to
elicit their initial job preferences. Stated preference methods are a useful way to measure
people’s preferences and priorities on specific topics. Commonly used in health, market-
ing, transportation and environmental economics, the DCE includes a variety of goods or
attributes, rather than just one (Adamowicz, Louviere, & Swait, 1998). DCE’s are based
on Lancaster’s consumer theory which has three assumptions (Lancaster 1966). Firstly,
the characteristics of the good give rise to utility, rather than the good itself. Secondly, a
good may possess more than one characteristic and additionally, many goods may share the
same characteristics. Lastly, multiple goods in combination may have different characteris-
tics from the same goods individually. McFadden (1974) built on this theory by combining
a deterministic model of behaviour with a statistical model, resulting in his Random Utility
Theory (RUT), commonly employed in DCE’s.
There are three main stages to conducting a DCE. The first stage is known as the survey
design and consists of: (i) characterizing a decision problem (e.g. what job characteristics
do people prefer when applying for a job); (ii) defining attributes and their levels; (iii)
setting the experimental design; (iv) developing the questionnaire; and (v) deciding on
the correct sampling strategy and data collection mode. The second stage involves the
econometric analysis of the choice data to determine the preferences of the individuals.
Lastly, the third stage focuses on policy analysis, obtaining welfare measures based on the
second stage.
DCE’s are very flexible as they take into account the multidimensionality of decision
problems, providing trade-offs between the different attributes themselves, as well as the
attributes and cost (in our case, salary), which allows us to calculate the WTP in order
to obtain a job characteristic (Adamowicz, Boxall, Williams & Louviere, 1998; Bennett &
Blamey, 2001; Bateman et al., 2002). The DCE results are useful for providing students,
companies, and policy-makers with an idea of what job characteristics young people look
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for.
2.2.2 Design of the DCE
We conducted a valuation survey at five universities, in three different countries. Three of
the universities were in Spain, specifically, a private and a public university in the Basque
Country, and a public university in Oviedo. We also conducted the survey at a public
university in Prague, Czech Republic and at a private university in Dortmund, Germany.
The questionnaire contained four parts: the objective of the questionnaire, a description
of the task they had to perform, the choice cards, and lastly, some socio-demographic
questions. Please see section A1 in Appendix A for a version of the final survey.
Our objective was to mimic the decision young people make when entering the labour
market, as closely as possible. That is, to choose a hypothetical job based on job attributes
a person would normally be aware of ex-ante. Our attribute-based research began by
analyzing which job characteristics students found to be important in previous literature,
as well as adding some other attributes we thought might be important. A focus group
of 15 people was conducted where students, teachers and administrators were invited to
participate. Fourth-year students made up the majority of the focus group, with a total
of 10 (two from the University of Oviedo, three from Deusto Business School, and the rest
from the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)), and were from various majors.
Four professors attended, from both undergraduate and postgraduate levels, along with
one employee from the University of the Basque Employment Centre. The objective of this
focus group was to make sure that we were including job attributes students would find
relevant in the DCE. The participants of the focus group were asked to rank the importance
of preliminarily chosen attributes from one to five, and if there were any other attributes
we should consider adding. Similarly, a focus group was conducted at the International
School of Management in Germany, and at the University of Economics, Prague.
After conducting the focus group and determining which attributes were the most im-
portant, we had to consider the number of attributes we would include in our DCE. This is
important since there is a trade-off between the number of attributes and the complexity
of the design. We decided that the seven attributes would be sufficient to describe
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Figure 2.1: Attributes and their Descriptions.
hypothetical job alternatives without a high degree of complexity. The seven attributes
were: (1) gross salary, the total salary offered, in local currency, before tax, represented
by four amounts; (2) commuting time, the amount of time required to travel one-way from
the respondent’s home to their work, represented by four different lengths of time given in
minutes; (3) long-term career prospect at the company, the possibility to advance or grow
at the company through promotions, represented by a simple yes/no option; (4) education
opportunity offered by the company (a masters), the tuition of an MBA covered by the com-
pany, also given as a yes/no option; (5) type of contract, portraying the difficulty or ease of
getting fired or not re-hired, represented as a temporary or permanent contract; (6) work
environment, in terms of relationships with co-workers and supervisors, as well as the orga-
nizational structure, represented as an old-fashioned company with a vertical structure, a
dynamic company with a horizontal structure, or a mix of the two; and (7) flexible schedule,
indicating if one has the power to change, or at least modify their own schedule, given as a
yes/no option. The choice card included pictures for every attribute level to facilitate the
choice task understanding. Figure 2.1 presents these pictures together with the definition
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of each attribute, and Figure 2.2 presents the levels of each corresponding attribute. All
these attributes were presented in three different hypothetical job alternatives.
Figure 2.2: Attributes and their Levels.
Note: Salary levels given here were for Germany.
Figure 2.3 presents the salary levels for each country, based on typical salary ranges of
young people entering the labour market (Destatis, 2014; INE, 2014; Servulo, 2016; Vlková,
2016). For Germany, the gross salary was represented annually, since that is more common,
and in the Czech Republic, the salary was given in Czech crowns, the local currency.
Figure 2.3: Salary Levels by Country.
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The seven attributes and their levels result in a large number of combinations (42 ×
24× 31), impeding a full factorial design. Thus a subset of the full factorial, or a fractional
factorial design, was implemented. We used a D-efficient design for random parameter
models, afterwards verifying the design did not have any dominant alternatives.
Figure 2.4 shows a sample choice card used in the questionnaire. The generated exper-
imental design was composed of 30 rows and was blocked into three blocks as the number
of choice occasions per individual was set to 10. We also randomly changed the order of
the choice cards to avoid an order effect, with a total of six versions of each block.
Figure 2.4: Sample Choice Card.
Since the DCE in our case describes three hypothetical job alternatives, we left it
unlabelled (Alternative A, B, C). Alternative specific constants (ASC) were included for two
of the three alternatives, representing unobserved sources of utility. Even though Hensher,
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Rose and Greene (2005) claimed that ASC’s should be left out of unlabelled experiments,
doing so would cause the other model parameters to attempt to capture this effect, which
could lead to biased parameter estimates (Morrison, Bennett, Blamey & Louviere, 2002).
The questionnaire was conducted among third or fourth year students at the end of
class. The instructions were explained to them and all students’ questions were attended
to. The pilot survey was conducted at the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)
in Bilbao in February 2016 with 33 individuals, and showed that the survey was not too long
nor too difficult to understand. After making minor changes to the wording, we conducted
the final survey between February and April 2016. Classes were randomly chosen using a
simple random sampling, where each class had an equal likelihood of being selected for the
sample.
Given the sampling strategy, we defined the minimum sample size we need. An equation
for the minimum sample size needed to calculate the true population proportion p with
a per cent of the true value p with probability α or greater was provided by Louviere,
Hensher and Swait (2000) and Hensher et al. (2005):
n ≥ 1− p
r × p× a2Φ
−1
(
1 + α
2
)
, (2.1)
where n represents the sample size needed, r is the number of responses per individual, and
Φ−1 is the inverse cumulative distribution function of a standard normal. Table 2.1 presents
the minimum sample sizes needed for our case of 10 responses per individual (r = 10), for
precision levels of 5% (a = 0.05), 8% (a = 0.08), 10% (a = 0.10) and 16% (a = 0.16),
with 95% probability (α = 0.95). The true population proportions are unknown, but the
proportions for our sample are 0.36, 0.31, 0.33 for alternatives A, B, and C, respectively.
This is to be expected as the alternatives are randomly ordered, with no status quo option.
Therefore, if we focus on the third row of Table 2.1, corresponding to p=0.3, the mini-
mum sample to achieve a precision level of 5% would be 183 individuals, whereas for a 10%
precision level only 46 respondents would be needed.
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Table 2.1: Minimum number of responses and individuals needed.
a=0.05 a=0.08 a=0.10 a=0.16
p Responses Indiv. Responses Indiv. Responses Indiv. Response Indiv.
0.1 7060 706 2760 276 1760 176 690 69
0.2 3140 314 1220 122 780 78 310 31
0.3 1830 183 710 71 460 46 180 18
0.4 1180 118 460 46 290 29 110 11
0.5 780 78 310 31 200 20 80 8
2.2.3 Data Collection
Data was collected at five universities. The University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)
is a public university with various campuses in the Basque Country of Spain. We conducted
our DCE within the Faculty of Economics and Business at the Sarriko campus in Bilbao, a
city of population 350,000 (950,000 metropolitan area). The Faculty on the Sarriko campus
offers six degrees: Business Administration, Economics, Finance and Insurance, Taxation
and Public Administration, Marketing, and a double degree in Business Administration
and Law. The annual tuition fee for each degree is approximately e1,000. The Faculty of
Economy and Business at the Sarriko campus has approximately a total number of 2,500
students. Classes are offered in Spanish, Basque or English.
Deusto Business School, also in the Basque Country of Spain, is part of a private
university called Deusto University. Our DCE was conducted within the Deusto Business
School on the Deusto campus in Bilbao. The Business School on this campus offers four
double degrees: Business Administration and Industrial Technology Engineering, Business
Administration and Law, Business Administration with a Specialization in Finance, and
Business Administration and Management in Digital Environments. The annual tuition
fee is between e9,000-10,000. The Deusto campus of the Deusto Business School has
approximately 1,300 students in total. Classes are offered in Spanish, Basque or English.
The University of Oviedo is a public university in the province of Asturias in Spain. Our
surveys were conducted at the Faculty of Economy and Business at the campus in Oviedo,
a city of population 220,000. The Faculty on the Oviedo campus, with approximately 2,400
students, offers five degrees: Business Administration, Economics, Finance and Insurance,
Human Resources and Labour Relations, and a double degree in Business Administration
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and Law. The annual tuition fee for each degree is e1,035, and classes are offered in
Spanish or English.
The University of Economics, Prague is a public university in Prague, Czech Republic.
The DCE was conducted at the main campus in Prague, a city of population 1,260,000
(2,150,000 metropolitan area); the University also has a smaller campus in another part
of Prague, and a smaller campus in another Czech city. The University has 25 bachelor
degrees offered by six faculties: the Faculty of Finance and Accounting, the Faculty of
International Relations, the Faculty of Business Administration, the Faculty of Informatics
and Statistics, the Faculty of Economics, and the Faculty of Management. Classes are
offered in Czech and the tuition is free, but students can request degrees to be taught in
other languages, such as Russian or English, which cost approximately e3,500 per year,
representing approximately 2% of the total students (15,000).
The International School of Management is a private university in Germany, with cam-
puses in Dortmund, Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg, Cologne and Stuttgart. The DCE was
conducted at the campus in Dortmund, a city of population 580,000. The School has seven
degrees: International Management, Tourism & Event Management, Marketing & Com-
munications Management, Finance & Management, Psychology & Management, Global
Brand & Fashion Management, and Business Law. Classes are offered in German and
English and the annual tuition is approximately e9,000 per year. There are approximately
4,000 students on the Dortmund campus.
Table 2.2 presents the sample sizes from our DCE for each university. Assuming that
the true proportion is 0.3, we need a sample of 71 to guarantee a precision level of 8%
(a = 0.08) with a 95% probability, which, as can be seen from Table 2.2, is met by the
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU) and the University of Economics, Prague.
The samples in Oviedo and Germany imply a precision level of 10%, while, unfortunately
the small Deusto Business School sample indicates a precision level of 16%.
Table 2.2: Sample Sizes by University.
University Location Type of University Number of Students
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU) Bilbao, Spain Public 132
Deusto Business School Bilbao, Spain Private 18
University of Oviedo Oviedo, Spain Public 63
University of Economics Prague, Czech Republic Public 95
International School of Management Dortmund, Germany Private 52
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2.2.4 Econometric Analysis
In order to estimate students’ job preferences, we need to transform the individual choice
responses to estimated parameters. We do this using two models, the first is the basic
Multinomial Logit (MNL) model (McFadden, 1974; Louviere et al., 2000), and the second
is a Random Parameter Logit (RPL).
For the MNL model, the utility function for person i (from a total of N individuals)
choosing alternative j (from a total of J alternatives) on choice card t (from a total of T
choice cards) is given by:
Uit,j = β
′xit,j + εit,j, (2.2)
where β′ is a vector of the utility weights, homogenous across the population, xit,j are at-
tribute levels, and εit,j is the error term, which is independently and identically distributed
as extreme value type I. This means that the unobserved part of the utility for one alterna-
tive is unrelated to the unobserved part of the utility for the other alternatives. We assume
that person i chooses alternative j on choice occasion t such that Uit,j > Uit,k.
In the MNL model, the probability of person i choosing alternative j in choice situation
t is given by:
Pit,j =
exp(x′it,jβ)∑J
j=1 exp(x
′
it,jβ)
. (2.3)
Since we have ten choice cards, we must calculate the joint probability using the likelihood
function. To make it manageable, we take the natural logarithm of both sides and end up
with the log-likelihood function:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
dit,jln(Pit,j), (2.4)
where dit,j = 1 if individual i chooses alternative j on choice occasion t and dit,j = 0
otherwise. This function is then maximized using maximum likelihood estimation.
While the MNL model can be used to represent systematic taste variations, based on
observable characteristics of the respondents, it cannot represent effects linked to random
taste variations, or unobservable characteristics. Thus, we also estimate the RPL model
which allows for heterogenous preferences which are random taste variations between peo-
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ple. Homogenous preferences, on the other hand, imply that two people with the same
observed socio-demographic values will have the exact same preferences. Thus, the RPL
model allows for more flexibility and is more of an accurate representation of real life.
The utility function of the RPL model is defined as:
Uit,j = β
′
ixit,j + εit,j, (2.5)
where β′i is a vector of individual specific attribute utility weights. This vector of βi’s can
be broken down into:
βi = β + ∆zi + Γνi, (2.6)
where β is a vector of parameters of the average values of the sample, zi is the vector of
the observed heterogenous preferences, generally affected by socio-demographic values, and
∆ the associated parameter matrix. The random unobserved heterogenous preferences are
represented by νi, a vector of uncorrelated random variables characterized by:
E(νi) = 0 and V ar(νi) = Σ = diag[σ1, σ2, ..., σK ]. (2.7)
The unknown lower triangular matrix Γ is to be estimated, assuming the parameters σi,
where i = 1, 2, ..., K are known constants. If the random parameters are uncorrelated, we
end up with a diagonal matrix Γ = diag[γ1, γ2, ..., γK ]. If we allow the random parameters
to be correlated, the full variance-covariance matrix becomes:
V ar(βi) = ΓΣΓ
′. (2.8)
Assuming that the random parameters are uncorrelated means imposing an additional
restriction on the model (Train & Weeks, 2005). Thus, the RPL model with correlated
parameters is more flexible, and allows us to interpret the corresponding correlation tables.
Since we have Ti observations for each individual i, the conditional probability of person
i choosing the sequences of T choices can be calculated by:
Pi|νi =
T∏
t=1
Pit|νi, (2.9)
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where Pit are probabilities of the chosen alternatives of person i on choice occasion t. Pit
is defined by (2.3) where β is substituted by (2.6). Given that νi is a random variable, we
must integrate νi out of the conditional probability:
Pi =
∫
νi
Pi|νih(νi)dνi, (2.10)
where h(νi) is the probability density function of the standardized random vector νi. To
calculate the joint probability we use the log-likelihood function:
logL =
N∑
i=1
lnPi|νi. (2.11)
Since we have to integrate over the random variable νi, it is much easier to estimate using
maximum likelihood running simulations. This can be done by maximizing the simulated
log-likelihood function:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
ln
[
1
R
R∑
r=1
ln
T∏
t=1
Pit|νir
]
, (2.12)
where νir is a simulated random draw from the assumed distribution, and R is the number
of replications.
As the parameters of the RPL model are randomly distributed, we must choose the
appropriate distribution function, something which has been of major research interests
in DCE’s, but there is still no consensus. In practice, the distributions are usually set
to normal since it is unknown whether people prefer it or not, thus allowing the effect of
the attribute to be either positive or negative on the utility function, but this can cause
serious problems in the WTP calculations; some popular distributions used for the cost
coefficient imply infinite moments for the distribution of WTP (Daly, Hess & Train, 2012).
If not much effort is taken to choose the distributions, the cost coefficient should at least
be log-normally distributed, assuring finite moments for WTP values.
Fosgerau and Bierlaire’s (2007) propose a semi-nonparametric test for mixing distribu-
tions, which tests if a random parameter follows an a priori postulated distribution. A
different approach is suggested by Fosgerau and Mabit (2013). This method takes ran-
dom draws from a standard distribution and then transforms them using a power series,
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allowing for a flexible and non-standard distribution without restrictive assumptions. How-
ever, information for researchers is still limited regarding the performance of the mentioned
tests. Lastly, Hensher and Greene (2003) suggested a simple and robust approach based
on plotting the incremental marginal utility, i.e., the contributions of all individuals to the
overall sample mean parameter estimate and thus profiling individual preference hetero-
geneity. Although this method does not include a proper statistical test, it provides us
with a visual notion of the underlying distributions of the parameters.
This is why we apply the method proposed by Hensher and Greene (2003). As can
be seen from the graphs in section A2 in Appendix A, the distributions of salary and
commuting time can be assumed to follow a log-normal distribution, while the rest of the
attributes can be said to follow more of a normal distribution.
Lastly, including a monetary attribute allows us to calculate the WTP, defined as the
willingness to pay for a unit change in an attribute. This is done by simulating random
distributions, using the estimates of the means and standard deviations from the RPL
results. In DCE’s, it is typically calculated as the change in one attribute with respect to
the cost (Hanemann, 1984; Train, 1998), or:
WTP = −βattribute
βcost
. (2.13)
However, in our case, the cost can be interpreted as one’s salary. Therefore, the inter-
pretation is the willingness to accept a reduction in salary for a unit change in a job
characteristic. Since most of the job characteristics are binary coded, it is the willingness
to accept a reduction in salary to obtain that job characteristic. For the WTP estimates,
we also need to take into account the random nature of the coefficients. For this purpose,
the coefficients in (2.13) are generated following the Krinsky and Robb (1986) procedure.
For example, the Contract attribute is coded as 1 if permanent contract, and 0 if temporary
contract; thus, the generated WTP distribution in order to obtain a permanent contract,
with its parameter distribution as normal and the Salary attribute parameter as lognormal
is specified as:
ŴTPC =
βˆC + σˆC · νC
exp(βˆSalary + σˆSalary · νSalary)
, (2.14)
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where βˆC and βˆSalary are the estimated means of the Contract and Salary random attribute
parameters, respectively, σˆC and σˆSalary are their corresponding estimated standard devia-
tions, and νC ∼ N(0, 1), νSalary ∼ N(0, 1).
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Basic statistics
Table 2.3 displays descriptive statistics of the sample respondents of each university. Ap-
proximately half of the participants are women, with a higher proportion at Deusto Business
School (69%). The mean age of the respondents is approximately 21 across all universi-
ties, with a family size of four. The average university grades are quite similar among
respondents across all universities; a 2.09 in the Czech Republic is approximately a 7 using
the Spanish grading system, while the average grade among respondents in Germany is
slightly higher at a 2.11 (approximately an 8). The entrance exam grades are similar be-
tween the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU) and the University of Oviedo, but
are slightly higher at Deusto Business School and at the University of Economics, Prague
(approximately an 8).
Other similarities exist between the respondents of the two public universities in Spain:
the University of Oviedo and the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU). To begin
with, they have a much lower English level in comparison to the respondents from the other
three universities. The education level of both the father and the mother are lower, as are
the proportions of both parents working. Lastly, the household income is also lower among
the respondents of these two universities in comparison to the others.
Regarding the language spoken at home, there is a mixture of languages spoken among
respondents from all universities apart from the University of Oviedo, 97% of whose re-
spondents are Spanish-speaking. Participants from different universities slightly differ in
terms of ideology; the most left-wing are respondents from the University of the Basque
Country (UPV/EHU), who reported an average of 3 on the left-right ideology scale, and the
most right-wing are respondents from the University of Economics, Prague, who reported
an average of 7.
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2.3.2 Estimation Results
The data collected from the DCE was estimated using Python Biogeme version 2.4 (Bier-
laire, 2008, 2016). Table 2.4 displays the multinomial logit results estimated for each
university. Two alternative-specific constants (ASC2, ASC3) for Alternative 2 and 3 re-
spectively, were included in the model, to allow for more flexibility. All variables apart
from salary and commuting time were coded as dummy variables. Specifically, long-term
career is 1 if the hypothetical job includes this attribute and 0, otherwise; education and
flexible schedule were coded the same way. The reference category for contract type is a
temporary contract, and the reference category for both work environment variables is an
old-fashioned company with a vertical structure.
For all five universities, the estimated coefficient for salary is positive, indicating that
an increase in salary causes an increase in the respondents’ utility. Similarly, having long-
term career or education opportunities, a permanent contract, a mixed or horizontal work
environment or a flexible schedule also increases respondents’ utility. An increase in com-
muting time, on the other hand, causes a decrease in the respondents’ utility, as is indicated
by the negative coefficient. All of these results are as expected, consistent with our a priori
Table 2.4: Multinomial Logit Results.
University of the
Basque Country
(UPV/EHU)
University of
Oviedo
Deusto Business
School
University of
Economics, Prague
International School
of Management
ASC2 0.092(0.076)
0.108
(0.111)
0.117
(0.221)
-0.015
(0.090)
0.391***
(0.127)
ASC3 0.017(0.075)
0.057
(0.107)
-0.476**
(0.242)
-0.106
(0.089)
0.181
(0.120)
Salary 2.480***(0.186)
2.160***
(0.267)
2.410***
(0.640)
0.174***
(0.017)
0.176***
(0.029)
Commuting Time -0.248***(0.026)
-0.165***
(0.040)
-0.230***
(0.082)
-0.242***
(0.033)
-0.123***
(0.039)
Long-term Career 1.270***(0.097)
1.490***
(0.146)
1.880***
(0.280)
1.540***
(0.120)
1.060***
(0.159)
Education 0.694***(0.101)
0.728***
(0.146)
1.080***
(0.342)
0.691***
(0.117)
0.720***
(0.154)
Contract 0.987***(0.073)
0.587***
(0.108)
0.403
(0.253)
0.070
(0.084)
0.230**
(0.104)
Mixed work env. 0.492***(0.082)
0.517***
(0.120)
0.737***
(0.279)
0.593***
(0.101)
0.818***
(0.234)
Horiz. work env. 0.512***(0.090)
0.293**
(0.127)
0.710***
(0.240)
0.554***
(0.101)
0.708***
(0.131)
Flexible Schedule 0.513***(0.075)
0.209*
(0.113)
0.132
(0.225)
0.391***
(0.091)
0.517***
(0.119)
Number of observations 1317 630 180 948 495
Log-likelihood -1202.290 -596.430 -152.644 -871.067 -490.074
AIC 2424.196 1212.860 325.288 1762.134 1000.148
BIC 2476.027 1257.317 357.218 1810.678 1042.194
Note: 1) Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses; 2) ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
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hypotheses. The MNL estimations are usually conducted to use as a benchmark for the
RPL estimations, which we present in the next tables.
Table 2.5 displays the results of the RPL model with correlated and uncorrelated coef-
ficients for the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU). The model with correlated
coefficients allows for correlations between the random coefficients representing the unob-
served preferences. In the two versions of the RPL model, we do not account for observed
preference heterogeneity because its inclusion makes the comparison across universities and
countries more difficult. Therefore, the matrix ∆ in (2.6) is assumed to be zero. In the
uncorrelated coefficient version of the RPL model, the matrix Γ in (2.6) is assumed to be a
diagonal matrix and in the correlated coefficient version Γ is a lower diagonal matrix. The
estimated elements of Γ, listed in the output tables, are needed to calculate the variance-
covariance matrix defined in (2.8). The standard errors of the estimated variance-covariance
matrix are calculated using the Delta method (Hensher et al., 2005).
Both versions of the RPL model include two random variables with a log-normal dis-
tribution (salary, commuting time), and the rest of the random variables are assumed to
have a normal distribution. The estimated means and standard deviations of the random
variables are very similar when comparing the two versions of the RPL model. Generally,
all of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The boxplot
shown on the right-hand side of all output tables and next to each coefficient is a simulation
of the coefficient’s distribution based on the estimations of the RPL model with correlated
parameters. These graphs allow for an easy comparison of the estimated distribution, which
is not easy to do with estimated means and standard deviations as log-normal distributions
are involved in this composition. The graphs show the distribution from the 25th to the
75th percentile, with the line representing the median. The simulated distributions indicate
that salary seems to be the most important attribute for students from the University of
the Basque Country (UPV/EHU).
Tables 2.6–2.9 display the RPL model results, with correlated and uncorrelated coeffi-
cients, for the University of Oviedo, Deusto Business School, the University of Economics,
Prague and the International School of Management. Once again, the estimated means
and standard deviations are very similar for all universities. All of the estimated means
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Table 2.5: University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU): RPL Results. Spain-public uni-
versity.
Model with Uncorrelated Coefficients Model with Correlated Coefficients
Est.
Mean St. Err. St. Dev. St. Err.
Est.
Mean St. Err. St.Dev. St. Err.
ASC2 0.217** (0.101) 0.224** (0.109)
ASC3 0.100 (0.103) 0.101 (0.110)
Random Parameters
Log-normal distribution
Salary 1.210*** (0.103) 0.588*** (0.083) 1.270*** (0.104) 0.601*** (0.102)
Commuting Time -1.200*** (0.150) 0.526*** (0.118) -0.991*** (0.132) 0.285*** (0.081)
Normal distribution
Long-term Career 1.960*** (0.173) 1.250*** (0.173) 2.110*** (0.196) 1.364*** (0.465)
Education 1.040*** (0.163) 0.807*** (0.183) 1.090*** (0.169) 0.893*** (0.120)
Contract 1.520*** (0.167) 1.300*** (0.170) 1.670*** (0.200) 1.387*** (0.241)
Mixed work env. 0.626*** (0.141) 0.578*** (0.182) 0.655*** (0.150) 0.689*** (0.092)
Horiz. work env. 0.711*** (0.136) 0.398 (0.271) 0.772*** (0.148) 0.615*** (0.113)
Flexible Schedule 0.725*** (0.126) 0.736*** (0.176) 0.811*** (0.133) 0.873* (0.474)
Covariances Elementsof Γ St. Err
Salary, Commuting time -0.274*** (0.062)
Salary, Long-term career -0.847*** (0.181)
Salary, Education -0.545** (0.253)
Salary, Contract -0.117 (0.219)
Salary, Mixed work env. -0.142 (0.168)
Salary, Horiz. work env. -0.032 (0.402)
Salary, Flexible schedule 0.076 (0.394)
Commuting time, Long-term career -0.135 (0.323)
Commuting time, Education -0.183 (0.194)
Commuting time, Contract -0.186 (0.368)
Commuting time, Mixed work env. 0.293 (0.212)
Commuting time, Horiz. work env. 0.272 (0.186)
Commuting time, Flexible schedule 0.342 (0.249)
Long-term career, Education 0.648 (0.418)
Long-term career, Contract 1.310*** (0.195)
Long-term career, Mixed work env. 0.350 (0.433)
Long-term career, Horiz. work env. -0.221 (0.188)
Long-term career, Flexible schedule 0.463 (0.424)
Education, Contract 0.388 (0.300)
Education, Mixed work env. -0.118 (0.558)
Education, Horiz. work env. -0.425 (0.282)
Education, Flexible schedule 0.216 (0.243)
Contract, Mixed work env. -0.371* (0.200)
Contract, Horiz. work env. 0.018 (0.274)
Contract, Flexible schedule -0.413*** (0.154)
Mixed work env., Horiz. work env. -0.165 (0.205)
Mixed work env., Flexible schedule -0.194 (0.185)
Horiz. work env., Flexible schedule 0.338 (0.219)
Number of observations 1317 1317
Log-likelihood -1083.199 -1076.282
AIC 2202.398 2244.564
BIC 2295.694 2482.987
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
are statistically significant at the 5% significance level.
The simulated distributions of the coefficients for the University of Oviedo, in Table
2.6, and for Deusto Business School in Table 2.7, illustrate that long-term career is almost
as important as salary. In Tables 2.8 and 2.9, for the University of Economics, Prague and
the International School of Management, long-term career seems to be the most important
job characteristic.
As expected, higher values of log-likelihood and lower values of AIC and BIC indicate
that RPL clearly outperforms MNL in all cases with the exception of the Deusto Business
School sample. This unexpected result is obtained due to the small sample size and suggests
that all results for that sample must be interpreted with caution.
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Table 2.6: University of Ovedio: RPL Results. Spain-public university.
Model with Uncorrelated Coefficients Model with Correlated Coefficients
Est.
Mean St. Err. St. Dev. St. Err.
Est.
Mean St. Err. St.Dev. St. Err.
ASC2 0.239 (0.155) 0.271* (0.160)
ASC3 0.138 (0.154) 0.158 (0.163)
Random Parameters
Log-normal distribution
Salary 1.100*** (0.156) 0.641*** (0.125) 1.170*** (0.163) 0.646*** (0.164)
Commuting Time -1.770*** (0.363) 0.683*** (0.202) -1.640*** (0.350) 0.578*** (0.080)
Normal distribution
Long-term Career 2.530*** (0.322) 1.370*** (0.231) 2.740*** (0.386) 1.438*** (0.469)
Education 1.180*** (0.250) 1.200*** (0.181) 1.270*** (0.257) 1.304*** (0.291)
Contract 0.807*** (0.224) 1.120*** (0.209) 0.860*** (0.241) 1.227*** (0.100)
Mixed work env. 0.736*** (0.163) 0.095 (0.135) 0.745*** (0.171) 0.206*** (0.033)
Horiz. work env. 0.412** (0.177) 0.352 (0.353) 0.428** (0.180) 0.512*** (0.024)
Flexible schedule 0.340 (0.208) 0.845*** (0.304) 0.372* (0.225) 0.940*** (0.138)
Covariances Elementsof Γ St. Err
Salary, Commuting time 0.222* (0.121)
Salary, Long-term career -0.930*** (0.293)
Salary, Education -0.021 (0.136)
Salary, Contract -0.297** (0.117)
Salary, Mixed work env. -0.018 (0.061)
Salary, Horiz. work env. 0.181 (0.113)
Salary, Flexible schedule 0.194* (0.104)
Commuting time, Long-term career 0.753*** (0.211)
Commuting time, Education -1.080*** (0.167)
Commuting time, Contract -0.846*** (0.183)
Commuting time, Mixed work env. 0.038 (0.057)
Commuting time, Horiz. work env. 0.116 (0.126)
Commuting time, Flexible schedule 0.433*** (0.164)
Long-term career, Education -0.361* (0.208)
Long-term career, Contract 0.149 (0.177)
Long-term career, Mixed work env. -0.039 (0.087)
Long-term career, Horiz. work env. -0.316** (0.153)
Long-term career, Flexible schedule -0.301 (0.226)
Education, Contract -0.590*** (0.228)
Education, Mixed work env. -0.136 (0.141)
Education, Horiz. work env. 0.026 (0.096)
Education, Flexible schedule 0.027 (0.168)
Contract, Mixed work env. -0.095 (0.121)
Contract, Horiz. work env. -0.183 (0.175)
Contract, Flexible schedule -0.548** (0.254)
Mixed work env., Horiz. work env. -0.233* (0.140)
Mixed work env., Flexible schedule -0.135 (0.190)
Horiz. work env., Flexible schedule -0.494* (0.257)
Number of observations 630 630
Log-likelihood -516.619 -513.536
AIC 1069.238 1119.072
BIC 1149.261 1323.575
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Deusto Business School: RPL Results. Spain-private university.
Model with Uncorrelated Coefficients Model with Correlated Coefficients
Est.
Mean St. Err. St. Dev. St. Err.
Est.
Mean St. Err. St.Dev. St. Err.
ASC2 0.321 (0.294) 0.377 (0.340)
ASC3 -0.512** (0.216) -0.566** (0.238)
Random Parameters
Log-normal distribution
Salary 1.140*** (0.342) 0.554** (0.271) 1.280*** (0.379) 0.586** (0.291)
Commuting Time -1.410*** (0.539) 0.689** (0.335) -1.090*** (0.403) 0.449 (0.382)
Normal distribution
Long-term Career 2.860*** (0.618) 1.600*** (0.603) 3.510*** (0.891) 1.775 (2.412)
Education 1.550*** (0.495) 1.060** (0.537) 2.120*** (0.712) 1.034*** (0.012)
Contract 0.604** (0.301) 0.928* (0.533) 0.850** (0.391) 1.080*** (0.114)
Mixed work env. 1.070*** (0.307) 0.213 (0.248) 1.370*** (0.366) 0.582*** (0.188)
Horiz. work env. 0.890*** (0.337) 0.074 (0.064) 0.917** (0.430) 0.464** (0.186)
Flexible Schedule -0.006 (0.400) 0.669** (0.264) -0.126 (0.525) 0.878*** (0.329)
Covariances Elementsof Γ St. Err
Salary, Commuting time 0.364*** (0.127)
Salary, Long-term career -0.298 (0.217)
Salary, Education -0.745 (0.502)
Salary, Contract -0.393 (0.342)
Salary, Mixed work env. 0.030 (0.290)
Salary, Horiz. work env. 0.303 (0.212)
Salary, Flexible schedule 0.366 (0.269)
Commuting time, Long-term career 0.488 (0.502)
Commuting time, Education 0.344 (0.490)
Commuting time, Contract -0.351 (0.254)
Commuting time, Mixed work env. 0.280 (0.753)
Commuting time, Horiz. work env. -0.200 (0.258)
Commuting time, Flexible schedule 0.490 (0.361)
Long-term career, Education -0.514* (0.269)
Long-term career, Contract 0.681* (0.405)
Long-term career, Mixed work env. -0.033 (0.266)
Long-term career, Horiz. work env. 0.118 (0.314)
Long-term career, Flexible schedule 0.393 (0.778)
Education, Contract 0.627 (0.469)
Education, Mixed work env. -0.089 (0.306)
Education, Horiz. work env. -0.149 (0.157)
Education, Flexible schedule -0.030 (0.492)
Contract, Mixed work env. -0.322 (0.379)
Contract, Horiz. work env. 0.173 (0.130)
Contract, Flexible schedule 0.056 (0.687)
Mixed work env., Horiz. work env. 0.048 (0.114)
Mixed work env., Flexible schedule 0.456* (0.256)
Horiz. work env., Flexible schedule -0.031 (0.307)
Number of observations 180 180
Log-likelihood -136.210 -133.704
AIC 308.42 359.408
BIC 365.893 506.284
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.8: University of Economics, Prague: RPL Results. The Czech Republic-public uni-
versity.
Model with Uncorrelated Coefficients Model with Correlated Coefficients
Est.
Mean St. Err. St. Dev. St. Err.
Est.
Mean St. Err. St.Dev. St. Err.
ASC2 0.049 (0.105) 0.052 (0.114)
ASC3 -0.097 (0.116) -0.111 (0.137)
Random Parameters
Log-normal distribution
Salary -1.360*** (0.121) 0.540*** (0.094) -1.290*** (0.138) 0.536*** (0.108)
Commuting Time -1.170*** (0.189) 0.689*** (0.156) -1.080*** (0.210) 0.730** (0.325)
Normal distribution
Long-term Career 2.530*** (0.256) 1.170*** (0.172) 2.700*** (0.352) 1.141 (5.049)
Education 1.160*** (0.213) 1.290*** (0.217) 1.220*** (0.264) 1.420 (1.695)
Contract 0.158 (0.164) 1.160*** (0.205) 0.153 (0.324) 1.229 (2.770)
Mixed work env. 0.879*** (0.163) 0.283 (0.353) 0.927*** (0.182) 0.483 (0.667)
Horiz. work env. 0.849*** (0.181) 0.754*** (0.255) 0.909*** (0.203) 0.862 (0.970)
Flexible Schedule 0.679*** (0.164) 0.837*** (0.225) 0.719*** (0.175) 0.971 (1.027)
Covariances Elementsof Γ St. Err
Salary, Commuting time 0.121 (0.157)
Salary, Long-term career -0.431 (4.620)
Salary, Education -0.188 (0.503)
Salary, Contract -0.148 (0.834)
Salary, Mixed work env. 0.307 (0.337)
Salary, Horiz. work env. 0.259 (0.468)
Salary, Flexible schedule 0.312 (0.694)
Commuting time, Long-term career -0.187 (0.579)
Commuting time, Education -0.796 (0.930)
Commuting time, Contract -0.118 (1.450)
Commuting time, Mixed work env. -0.209 (0.280)
Commuting time, Horiz. work env. -0.603* (0.352)
Commuting time, Flexible schedule -0.328 (0.664)
Long-term career, Education 0.703 (0.500)
Long-term career, Contract 0.899 (1.510)
Long-term career, Mixed work env. -0.261 (1.150)
Long-term career, Horiz. work env. -0.306 (1.510)
Long-term career, Flexible schedule -0.107 (1.550)
Education, Contract -0.453 (1.080)
Education, Mixed work env. -0.114 (1.330)
Education, Horiz. work env. -0.134 (0.325)
Education, Flexible schedule -0.096 (0.752)
Contract, Mixed work env. -0.088 (2.290)
Contract, Horiz. work env. -0.209 (2.030)
Contract, Flexible schedule 0.047 (1.070)
Mixed work env., Horiz. work env. 0.385 (0.378)
Mixed work env., Flexible schedule 0.461* (0.273)
Horiz. work env., Flexible schedule 0.487 (0.588)
Number of observations 948 948
Log-likelihood -770.879 -765.966
AIC 1577.758 1623.932
BIC 1665.136 1847.232
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.9: International School of Management: RPL Results. Germany-private university.
Model with Uncorrelated Coefficients Model with Correlated Coefficients
Est.
Mean St. Err. St. Dev. St. Err.
Est.
Mean St. Err. St.Dev. St. Err.
ASC2 0.526*** (0.163) 0.540*** (0.170)
ASC3 0.259* (0.141) 0.262* (0.147)
Random Parameters
Log-normal distribution
Salary -1.650*** (0.227) 0.527*** (0.169) -1.610*** (0.208) 0.521*** (0.157)
Commuting Time -2.590*** (0.653) 1.320*** (0.340) -2.560*** (0.619) 1.345 (0.873)
Normal distribution
Long-term Career 1.370*** (0.243) 0.985*** (0.262) 1.390*** (0.226) 1.040*** (0.102)
Education 0.858*** (0.191) 0.727*** (0.208) 0.854*** (0.189) 0.794*** (0.189)
Contract 0.342** (0.146) 0.527*** (0.189) 0.370** (0.149) 0.559*** (0.039)
Mixed work env. 1.020*** (0.200) 0.221 (0.341) 1.090*** (0.205) 0.434*** (0.002)
Horiz. work env. 0.897*** (0.196) 0.070 (0.095) 0.960*** (0.212) 0.328** (0.132)
Flexible Schedule 0.612*** (0.178) 0.752*** (0.255) 0.608*** (0.181) 0.810*** (0.053)
Covariances Elementsof Γ St. Err
Salary, Commuting time -0.121 (0.102)
Salary, Long-term career -0.365* (0.194)
Salary, Education 0.283*** (0.087)
Salary, Contract 0.208 (0.193)
Salary, Mixed work env. 0.277 (0.172)
Salary, Horiz. work env. 0.033 (0.060)
Salary, Flexible schedule 0.107 (0.227)
Commuting time, Long-term career 0.945*** (0.289)
Commuting time, Education 0.453* (0.241)
Commuting time, Contract 0.219 (0.150)
Commuting time, Mixed work env. 0.162 (0.122)
Commuting time, Horiz. work env. 0.035 (0.097)
Commuting time, Flexible schedule -0.524*** (0.176)
Long-term career, Education -0.371*** (0.104)
Long-term career, Contract -0.227 (0.141)
Long-term career, Mixed work env. 0.191 (0.125)
Long-term career, Horiz. work env. -0.026 (0.064)
Long-term career, Flexible schedule -0.468** (0.237)
Education, Contract -0.400*** (0.114)
Education, Mixed work env. -0.007 (0.081)
Education, Horiz. work env. -0.059 (0.083)
Education, Flexible schedule 0.108 (0.303)
Contract, Mixed work env. 0.112 (0.085)
Contract, Horiz. work env. 0.209 (0.253)
Contract, Flexible schedule 0.105 (0.331)
Mixed work env., Horiz. work env. -0.204 (0.203)
Mixed work env., Flexible schedule 0.339 (0.311)
Horiz. work env., Flexible schedule -0.119 (0.161)
Number of observations 495 495
Log-likelihood -460.542 -458.997
AIC 957.084 1009.994
BIC 1032.802 1203.404
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Tables 2.10–2.14 present the correlation matrices computed by the use of estimated
parameters from the RPL model with correlated coefficients for each university. In our
interpretation of the correlations between the random parameters of our model, we need
to be very cautious since the number of estimated coefficients is very high, decreasing
the degrees of freedom. As a result, we only focus on the interpretations which appear
repeatedly in more than one university.
Generally, the correlations vary between public and private universities, as well as be-
tween countries; however, a couple of interesting correlations are worth highlighting. First
of all, in all universities except for the University of Economics, Prague, there is a negative
correlation between long-term career and salary. This implies that individuals with strong
preferences for long-term career opportunities, generally have lower preferences for salary.
Second of all, the correlation between contract type and a horizontal work environment
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% significance level for the University of the
Basque Country (UPV/EHU) and the University of Oviedo, but not statistically significant
for the other three universities. Given the unemployment rate in Bilbao and Oviedo, as well
as the lower financial stability found among these respondents in the descriptive statistics,
entry into the labour market is the most difficult for students from these two universities.
This could explain why respondents from these two universities with strong preferences for
a permanent contract, have lower preferences for a better work environment.
Table 2.10: Correlation Results for the University of the Basque Country (EHU/UPV). Spain-public university.
Salary Commutingtime
Long-term
career Education Contract
Mixed
work env.
Horiz.
work env. Schedule
Salary 1
Commuting time -0.962*** 1
Long-term career -0.621*** 0.571** 1
Education -0.610** 0.531*** 0.963** 1
Contract -0.084 0.045 0.800*** 0.832*** 1
Mixed work env. -0.206 0.314 0.481 0.365 0.353 1
Horiz. work env. -0.052 0.171 -0.291 -0.488 -0.585** 0.000 1
Flexible Schedule 0.087 0.023 0.319 0.312 0.476 0.532 -0.012 1
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.11: Correlation Results for the University of Oviedo. Spain-public university.
Salary Commutingtime
Long-term
career Education Contract
Mixed
work env.
Horiz.
work env. Schedule
Salary 1
Commuting time 0.383* 1
Long-term career -0.647*** 0.235 1
Education -0.016 -0.771*** -0.577*** 1
Contract -0.242** -0.730*** -0.137 0.308 1
Mixed work env. -0.088 0.139 0.050 -0.423 -0.029 1
Horiz. work env. 0.353* 0.345 -0.452 0.003 -0.509*** 0.022 1
Flexible Schedule 0.206* 0.505*** -0.070 -0.283 -0.694*** 0.304 0.479** 1
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2.12: Correlation Results for Deusto Business School. Spain-private university.
Salary Commutingtime
Long-term
career Education Contract
Mixed
work env.
Horiz.
work env. Schedule
Salary 1
Commuting time 0.811* 1
Long-term career -0.168 0.025 1
Education -0.721 -0.389*** -0.258 1
Contract -0.364 -0.485 0.569 0.044 1
Mixed work env. 0.051 0.323 0.071 0.098 -0.390 1
Horiz. work env. 0.653 0.277 0.013 -0.853 -0.063 -0.278 1
Flexible Schedule 0.417 0.665 0.507 -0.350 -0.061 0.576 0.225 1
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2.13: Correlation Results for the University of Economics, Prague. The Czech Republic-public university.
Salary Commutingtime
Long-term
career Education Contract
Mixed
work env.
Horiz.
work env. Schedule
Salary 1
Commuting time 0.166 1
Long-term career -0.378 -0.224 1
Education -0.132 -0.575 0.593 1
Contract -0.120 -0.115 0.728 0.192 1
Mixed work env. 0.635 -0.321 -0.661 -0.262 -0.444 1
Horiz. work env. 0.300 -0.640 -0.322 0.076 -0.305 0.842 1
Flexible Schedule 0.321 -0.280 -0.166 0.028 -0.024 0.505 0.644 1
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2.14: Correlation Results for the International School of Management. Germany-private university.
Salary Commutingtime
Long-term
career Education Contract
Mixed
work env.
Horiz.
work env. Schedule
Salary 1
Commuting time -0.090 1
Long-term career -0.351* 0.936*** 1
Education 0.357*** 0.536* 0.287 1
Contract 0.372 0.356 0.133 0.136 1
Mixed work env. 0.639 0.315 0.215 0.226 0.263 1
Horiz. work env. 0.102 0.098 0.044 0.032 0.354 -0.035 1
Flexible Schedule 0.132 -0.656** -0.765*** 0.024 -0.042 -0.197 -0.268 1
Note: ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
2.3.3 Willingness to Pay
In this section, we present the simulated WTP distributions which are derived from the
estimated coefficients of the random parameters of the RPL model, with correlated and
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uncorrelated coefficients. This allows us to make a relative comparison between models,
universities and countries. WTP graphs are very similar for both versions of the RPL
model given the very similar estimates presented in Tables 2.5–2.9; therefore, we only
present the graphs from the RPL models with correlated coefficients. Figure 2.5 presents
the WTP graphs for all universities. Similar to the boxplots included in Tables 2.5–2.9,
the graphs show the 25th to the 75th percentile of the WTP distribution together with the
corresponding median value.
Looking at the universities overall, Figure 2.5 show that the most important job charac-
teristic is long-term career opportunity. Not only is this consistent across all three countries,
but also across both public and private universities. This result is also, surprisingly, consis-
tent with the findings of Lim and Soon (2006), who found that long-term career possibility
was the most important job attribute for economics students in Malaysia. Education op-
portunity is also very important for students, and once again, independent of the type of
university or the country.
Comparing Spanish and non-Spanish universities, particularly, Figures 2.5a,b,c with
2.5d,e, commuting time is of high importance to Spanish students, while it is one of the
least important attributes to respondents in the Czech Republic and Germany, indicating
that it is most likely due to a cultural difference. Additionally, contract type is of low
importance to respondents from the Czech Republic and Germany, but of high importance
to Spanish students, especially to those from public universities. The high unemployment
rate in Spain is a likely explanatory factor, creating a sense of insecurity in the labour
market.
Furthermore, comparing public and private universities, namely Figures 2.5c,e with
2.5a,b,d, we can see that both the horizontal and mixed work environment is higher among
respondents from private universities. One explanation for this result could be based on
some comments private university students made in our focus groups, namely, that their
goal was to work at “A-level” companies, such as Google, which are known for their good
work environments, for example, offering their employees free meals, play areas, massage
rooms and free yoga classes.
Lastly, the least important attribute for students is having a flexible schedule; consistent
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across all universities regardless of the type of university or country. This is most likely
due to the fact that at the beginning of their careers, students know they will have to show
their skills, abilities and devotion for the company, which sometimes leads to extra hours.
Moreover, at this stage in their lives, young people do not require that much flexibility in
their schedules, as they become older and have families, however, the demand for flexibility
increases.
Figure 2.5: WTP distributions by University.
Note: The WTP for commuting time is calculated for 30 minutes.
2.4 Discussion and Conclusions
We elicited students’ job preferences using a DCE, a more quantitative and rigorous method
than had been previously used in the literature. Taking into account students’ job pref-
erences, we simulated the WTP based on RPL model estimations for students at five
universities, in three countries, at both public and private universities. We found that the
possibility of working at the company long-term is the most important attribute, across
countries and regardless of whether the university is public or private. Furthermore, peo-
ple who have high preferences for long-term career possibilities, have lower preferences for
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salary. Thus, if companies cannot offer applicants high salaries, they could offer them
the possibility of working at the company long-term. Surprisingly, similar results were
also found in Malaysia by Lim and Soon (2006), as well as most of the studies conducted
among business students, which seems to suggest that students, in general, like to have the
prospect of a long-term career at the company. Even though young employees might not
choose to stay at the same job indefinitely, they would like that decision to be up to them
rather than knowing their position at the company is stagnant.
Another important attribute for all students, regardless of the university, is the oppor-
tunity to further their education. Gaining work experience while at the same time further
investing in their education is a good strategy in a labour market that is unstable with
increasing demands. This is an obvious benefit for the company as well, if the company
can afford it.
When comparing Spanish and non-Spanish universities, we found two differences. Firstly,
for Spanish students, commuting time is an important attribute, while for students in the
Czech Republic and Germany it is not. This is most likely a cultural difference, perhaps
Spanish students prefer being closer to their families and are less willing to move, while
students in the Czech Republic and Germany would simply move closer to the job, as
was mentioned by a student in our focus group in Germany. Secondly, the importance of
having a permanent contract was higher among Spanish students, especially at the two
public universities, than the rest. This is clearly a result of the ongoing economic reces-
sion and the high unemployment rate in Spain. Additionally, students at the two public
universities in Spain, who are likely to have a more difficult time finding a job than the
rest, prefer forgoing a better work environment in order to obtain a job with a permanent
contract. Unfortunately, the effects of the 2008 economic recession still loom large, with
a very high unemployment rate, especially among young people, so for people with fewer
financial resources, a permanent contract is more important than having a positive work
environment. Many companies in Spain are taking advantage of the high unemployment
rate, and offering mostly temporary contracts, which allows them the freedom to hire and
fire (or not re-hire) anyone they want. Students should be more aware of labour market
conditions and, therefore, not expect to obtain a permanent contract easily. Additionally,
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policymakers could intervene, for example, offering a tax break to companies that employ
young people with a permanent contract.
The only difference found between public and private universities was that for stu-
dents at private universities, a better work environment was more important. Contrary to
students at the two public universities in Spain, who were willing to forgo a better work en-
vironment to obtain a permanent contract, students from private universities have enough
financial stability to not worry about the type of contract. Comments made by students
in our focus groups at private universities suggest that work environment is important for
them because their goal is to work at “A-level” companies, known for its modern work envi-
ronment. Perhaps the biggest difference between students at public and private universities
is the type of company they apply to afterwards.
The least important job attribute is having a flexible schedule, indicating that, when
they first enter the labour market, young people expect to have to prove their worth
which can lead to more hours at work. Additionally, the demand for a flexible schedule
tends to increase with age, due to family obligations. Therefore, instead of offering them
a flexible schedule, companies should offer new applicants long-term career or education
opportunities, if they can.
Analyzing students’ job preferences can be beneficial for students, companies, and pol-
icymakers. Butler et al. (2000) showed that students are not aware of the true weights of
their job preferences. When asked which attributes they find important, they do not give
an accurate reflection of their preferences as when several attributes are combined together,
in the form of job opportunities. Thus, learning about their preferences more accurately
will inform them if they need to change or adjust them, better matching available job offer
conditions. Companies should be aware of young people’s job preferences so that they can
try to adapt, thereby attracting more candidates and being able to choose a better em-
ployee. Naturally, companies cannot always afford to offer new employees their preferred
conditions, but with these kinds of studies, they can decrease the probability of offering
them job characteristics they find unimportant. Lastly, policymakers need to be aware of
these preferences, in addition to the conditions of the labour market, in order to help match
young job-seekers with companies.
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Our study is a good start to analyzing students’ job preferences across various univer-
sities. The DCE is a useful tool to study the multidimensional character of choosing a job,
taking into account the heterogenous preferences of the sample. It allows us to identify
which attributes are more important than others. With regards to further research, it would
be interesting to conduct the DCE in other regions of Spain as well as other European and
non-European countries. Additionally, conducting a DCE to estimate revealed preferences
of young people after entering the labour market would be a great comparison.
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3 | Political Ideology and Distributive
Preferences: An Experimental Test
3.1 Introduction
There is growing evidence in the social sciences that one’s material interest is more im-
portant than ideology when it comes to redistributive preferences. This importance of
economic conditions has been found both using survey data and experimental data (Barr,
Burns, Miller & Shaw, 2015; Barr, Miller & Ubeda, 2016; Margalit, 2013; Owens & Pedulla,
2014). However, whereas non-experimental studies typically estimate jointly the effect of
ideology and economic position, experimental studies have largely ignored ideology. In this
paper, we explicitly test for political ideology using an experiment.
Margalit (2013) was endeavored to disentangle self-interest from ideology, and compare
the effects of the two factors on social policy preferences. Using panel surveys, he ex-
amined the effect of an individual’s job loss on his/her preferences for redistribution. He
found that individuals who were employed in the first wave of surveys and then lost their
jobs, became more pro-redistribution. Their preferences on other policy issues, however,
were unaffected. He concluded that individuals become more pro-redistribution following
a negative economic shock owing to self-interest and not a shift in their ideological value.
Owens and Pedulla (2014), who also used a panel survey, found similar results to Margalit
(2013).
Another way to separate self-interest from ideology is to observe participants’ distribu-
tive preferences experimentally. Additionally, using an experiment bypasses the problem
of subjects potentially answering questions in a way they think might be “desirable”, since
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experiments can be designed in such a way that the participants do not know what the ex-
perimenter is trying to measure. Scott, Matland, Michelbach and Bornstein (2001) as well
as Michelbach, Scott, Matland and Bornstein (2003) used experiments to study distribu-
tive justice. They invited participants to read a short description of a hypothetical society,
which they were not a part of, and then asked them to evaluate policy alternatives based
on income distributions. Other studies use two-stage experimental designs involving a pro-
duction stage, followed by a dictator game. Konow (2000) and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and
Kurki (2004) used such designs to examine the roles of fairness and self-interest during the
allocation of economic rewards. In both cases, the “recipient” took part in the production
stage and, afterwards, the “dictator” decided how to divide the money between them. Since
the total amount of money in the second stage was determined by how well the recipient
did in the first stage, the dictator’s decision was between his/her own self-interest and the
recipient’s “just deserts”. Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen and Tungodden (2007) conducted a
similar two-stage experiment, but in the production stage, participants were asked to make
an investment, rather than perform a real-effort task. They estimated the degree of het-
erogeneity in fairness ideals and found that liberal egalitarianism was the most prevalent.
Erkal, Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2011), on the other hand, conducted a real-effort task
followed by a four-person dictator game, adding in a random shock, portraying luck, which
decreased the earnings of some of the players in one of the treatments. They found that
those who ranked first were significantly less likely to give than those ranked second.
Some researchers have taken such two-stage experiments into the field. “Lab-in-the-field”
experiments engage and work with non-student participants in or close to their natural en-
vironment (Morton & Williams, 2010, pp.296). Using this method, Jakiela, Miguel and
te Velde (2015) found that, in Kenya, an increase in human capital caused an increase in
acknowledgment of earned entitlement (AEE). Cappelen, Moene, Sørensen and Tungod-
den (2013) conducted a two-stage experiment matching participants in two of the richest
countries, Norway and Germany, with participants in two of the poorest countries, Uganda
and Tanzania. Distributive decisions did not vary with nationality, but were affected by
perceptions of both entitlement and neediness. The latter was more important to partici-
pants in the two low-income countries, consistent with self-serving bias. Lastly, Barr and
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coauthors (Barr et al., 2015; Barr er al., 2016) focused on the effect of economic status
on distributive preferences. Using an experiment that they conducted in South Africa, the
UK and Spain, they found that participants who were employed or well-off acknowledged
earned entitlement, while those who were unemployed or poor did not. In other words, the
poor and unemployed were more pro-redistribution.
The contribution of this paper is to test the effect of political ideology on distributive
preferences elicited in a “lab-in-the-field” experiment. As far as we know, this is the first
study to use an experiment to investigate the relationship between political ideology and
preferences for redistribution. There is also surprisingly little evidence on the correlation
between standardized measures of political ideology and self-reported perceptions of fair-
ness. Typically, these two measures are included as predictors of other variables, such as
preferences for redistribution (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010) or social welfare preferences (Mar-
galit, 2013). An important exception is Evans (1997). In one of the results found in his
paper, political ideology (measured using a left-right scale) is correlated with responses to
a vignette experiment portraying meritocratic views. The author finds a weak correlation
in the expected direction: right-wing responders tend to put more weight on individual
responsibility, a typical attribute of the meritocratic view.
The experiment reported here consisted of a real-effort task, followed by a four-person
dictator game. The two treatments in the experiment differed in how the initial endow-
ments of the four-person dictator game were determined. In the earned treatment, the
endowments were ranked according to performance in the real-effort task, and in the ran-
dom treatment, the endowments were assigned randomly. The two treatments allowed us
to estimate AEE and how it relates to political ideology. We found that ideology has a
weak effect on distributive preferences when considering the entire sample. The extreme-
left-wing participants do not acknowledge earned entitlement, exhibiting egalitarian values.
Then, as self-reported political ideology move rightwards, AEE increases. When analyz-
ing the results by economic status, we find that ideology has a strong effect on AEE for
students, and no effect for unemployed or employed participants.
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Experimental Design
Spain is made up of several regions, many with their own distinct languages and cultures.
We conducted our experiment in Bilbao, in the north of Spain, and in Cordoba, in the
south of Spain, so that the generalizability of our findings could be investigated.1 The
experiment was conducted in 2014 and consisted of two parts. In the first part of the
experiment, participants were asked to engage in a real-effort task, an easy-to-understand,
manual task for which no skills were required.2 In the second part of the experiment,
participants took part in a four-person dictator game. A tray divided into four quadrants,
with each quadrant corresponding to a group member, was handed to each participant.
Initial endowments of each of the group members were indicated with black counters that
were placed in each quadrant (1 counter = e 1). The four possible initial endowment
values were e 6, e 10, e 12 and e 16. Participants were then told they could move the
counters around however they wanted, as long as no counter left the tray. Once everyone
had finished, the decisions of one group member were randomly chosen to determine the
final payoffs. At no time did participants know who the other group members were, and
they were told their final allocation decisions would remain anonymous. Apart from the
final payoff, participants also received a e 4 show-up fee.
There were two treatments. In the earned treatment, a participant’s initial endowment
was directly related to their rank in the real-effort task; the person who performed the
best, started with the highest initial endowment in the four-person dictator game. In the
random treatment, the initial endowments were randomly assigned—the two parts of the
experiment were not connected in any way.
At the end of the experiment, participants completed a survey which included questions
on their basic demographics, self-reported health, and economic status. There was also a
question containing a left-right scale going from one (left) to ten (right) and was worded
as follows: When people talk about politics, the terms left and right are usually used. Below
1This is the same experiment as was used by Barr et al. (2016) and is based on the experiment
conducted by Barr et al. (2015).
2Please see section B1 in Appendix B for a more detailed description of the experiment.
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there is a left-right axis. Where would you place yourself on this axis? Indicate it with an
X.3 We refer to this question as left-right instead of ideology since the political frame of the
question has been removed. Furthermore, we used a 10-point scale so we could compare it
to previous studies, such as to Alesina and Giuliano (2011).4
3.2.2 Analytical Framework
Since we are interested in analyzing the effect of one’s placement on the left-right axis on
distributive preferences, several variables should be included in our model. Initial endow-
ment of the other three group members plays an important role because in the earned
treatment, it is directly linked with the participant’s rank in the real-effort task; this is
necessary to measure AEE. Including the treatment the participant was in allows us to
measure the difference between the two treatments. Lastly, since the main focus of this
paper is on political ideology, or left-right, it must also be included in the model.
We began by using the same analytical model as Barr et al. (2015) and Barr et al.
(2016), substituting left-right i for unemployedi. We call this Model 1:
xij 6=i = β0 + β1Ei + β2yj + β3(Ei × yj) + β4left− righti + β5(Ei × left− righti)
+ β6(yj × left− righti) + β7(Ei × yj × left− righti) + εij (3.1)
where xij is the final allocation assigned by participant i to participant j (note that we
3We also checked if respondents’ answers to: Which of the following people or organizations do you
think has the greatest responsibility to help the poor? were in line with their self-reported left-right measure.
Participants self-reporting to be a four or lower stated that the government (72%) and charities/non-profit
organizations (10%) should help. Fewer respondents from the other end of the spectrum (anything higher
than a five) reported that the government should help (42%), followed by charities/non-profit organizations
(23%) and the Church (18.5%). These results are consistent with their placement on the left-right axis.
4Lo, Proksch and Gschwend (2014) address scaling issues when it comes to a participant’s ideology,
but these only arise with cross-national and other studies that pool data from different surveys; the World
Values Survey uses a scale of one to ten for ideology, the General Social Survey uses a scale of one to seven,
and the European Election Studies uses a scale of one to eleven. The scale from one to ten is the most
common in Spain.
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only consider i 6= j for our analysis),5 Ei is a dummy variable which equals 1 for the earned
treatment, yj is the initial endowment of participant j, and left-right i is participant i’s
placement on the left-right axis.
We encountered multicollinearity issues due to the lack of variation in the left-right
variable, so we divided it into four groups and estimated Model 1 for each group. Since the
frequency distribution of left-right is slightly skewed to the left, with few observations on
the far-right of the axis, our groupings were slightly skewed to the left as well, maintaining
comparable sample sizes in each group. It would have been ideal to group two left-right
“points” together, i.e., 1+2, 3+4, 5+6, 7+8, 9+10, but, as can be seen from Table 3.1,
we would have encountered sample size problems on the far-right of the scale. Had we
grouped together fewer left-right values than 6–10, the sample size would have been small
and incomparable to the other groups.
Table 3.1: Distribution of left-right.
Left-right 1 2 3 4 5 5.5 6 7 8 9 10
Frequency 33 41 103 63 98 4 34 18 5 4 1
We defined the “extreme-left” as those who self-reported being a one or a two on the
left-right axis, the “left-wing” as being a three or a four, and the “centre” as being a five.6
Lastly, we grouped all participants who self-reported being a six or higher and classified
them as being “right-wing”. Since the regression is limited to each grouping of left-right, all
interactions with the left-right variable from Model 1 drop out, and we are left with Model
2:
xij 6=i = β0 + β1Ei + β2yj + β3(Ei × yj) + εij. (3.2)
Note that in both models, there are three observations for each participant, so we
clustered errors at the individual level.
5This excludes allocations to self. We only focus on allocations to others, however, we will use alloca-
tions to self to estimate selfishness later.
65.5 was chosen by four respondents which have also been categorized as centre.
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3.2.3 Sample
We ran 13 experimental sessions in Bilbao, seven sessions of 16 participants and six sessions
of 12, with a total of 184 participants. In Cordoba we ran 16 experimental sessions, nine
sessions of 16 participants and the rest of 12, with a total of 228 participants. The large
majority of the sample (95%) was aged 20–35.
Table 3.2 displays the main characteristics of our sample, which is evenly distributed
among gender and city, with no large differences between the ideology groupings.7 The
average participant is approximately 27 years old and has a post-secondary education.
Left-right is slightly skewed to the left, with a mean value of four.
Table 3.2: Participants and treatment assignment.
All Extreme-Left Left Centre Right
Sample sizes 404 74 166 102 62
Characteristics
Female (%) 53% 51% 60% 49% 45%
Age (mean) 26.9 27.3 27.4 26.1 26.3
Years in education 17.9 18.3 18.1 17.2 18.2
Left-right 4 (mean) 1, 2 3, 4 5, 5.5 6 – 10
Location
Bilbao (%) 44.3% 58.1% 44.0% 37.3% 40.3%
Cordoba (%) 55.7% 41.9% 56.0% 62.8% 59.7%
Treatments
Random (%) 40.6% 37.8% 41.6% 41.2% 40.3%
Earned (%) 59.4% 62.2% 58.4% 58.8% 59.7%
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.3 presents a summary of the final allocations made by the participants. The first
row of each treatment section displays the percentage of people who allocated zero to
7Out of 412 participants, eight people left the left-right question unanswered, but since this is slightly
less than 2% of our sample, we are not concerned about our results being biased. If we impute the eight
missing values, the results remain the same.
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each of the other three members of their plying group, we use the term “selfish” when we
talk about these participants. There is a slightly higher percentage of selfish decisions in
the earned treatment than in the random treatment. The right-wing participants are more
likely to make selfish decisions in comparison to everyone else; in the earned treatment, 27%
of right-wing participants kept all of the initial endowments for themselves. This is almost
three times the likelihood observed among centre and more than four times that observed
among extreme-left. The second and third rows display the percentage of participants
that made equal allocations across the other group members, participant i excluded and
included respectively. More participants made equal allocations in the random treatment
than in the earned, which is what we would expect, since in the former treatment, initial
endowments were allocated by luck. In the random treatment, a higher percentage of
extreme-left and left-wing participants allocated one-quarter of all endowments to each
group member than the rest, 36% and 35% in comparison to 24% and 20%. Similarly, in
the earned treatment, a much higher percentage of the extreme-left allocated one-quarter
to each person, exhibiting egalitarian traits. The fourth row in each section of the table
presents the percentage of participants that left initial endowments unchanged. A slightly
higher percentage of participants in the earned treatment left the tray untouched compared
to the random treatment. The last two rows of each section present mean final allocations
by participants to themselves and to others. The mean allocations to self and others vary
Table 3.3: Experimental data summarized.
All Extreme-Left Left Centre Right
Random Treatment
Allocated zero to all others (%) 7.9% 10.7% 4.4% 14.3% 4.0%
Equal allocations across other three (%) 73.8% 71.4% 78.3% 71.4% 68.0%
One quarter to each of the four (%) 29.9% 35.7% 34.8% 23.8% 20.0%
Left initial endowments unchanged (%) 1.2% 0% 1.5% 2.4% 0%
Allocation to self (mean proportion) 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.46
Allocation to others (mean proportion) 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.18
Earned Treatment
Allocated zero to all others (%) 11.3% 6.5% 8.3% 10.0% 27.0%
Equal allocations across other three (%) 52.1% 63.0% 42.3% 51.7% 64.9%
One quarter to each of the four (%) 16.7% 28.3% 12.4% 16.7% 13.5%
Left initial endowments unchanged (%) 7.1% 6.5% 10.3% 6.7% 0%
Allocation to self (mean proportion) 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.57
Allocation to others (mean proportion) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.14
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only marginally across the treatments, except in the case of the right-wing participants,
who allocated considerably more to themselves in the earned treatment.
3.3.2 Main Effect of Political Ideology
Table 3.3 shows some evidence of extreme-left-wing participants having egalitarian tenden-
cies, however, it is only a descriptive statistics table. Table 3.4, on the other hand, displays
the results of an OLS regression estimated for the full sample excluding the selfish, i.e.,
participants who allocated zero to everyone but themselves. We exclude them on the basis
that they do not provide any information on their distributive preferences, following the
methodology of Barr et al. (2015).8
Table 3.4: Regression analysis of allocations to others.
Dependent variable = participant i’s final allocation to participant j
Full Sample
Excluding Selfish Std. Error
Earned treatment (Ei) -0.042 (0.031)
j’s initial endowment (yj) -0.004 (0.078)
yj × Ei 0.098 (0.113)
left-right i -0.003 (0.005)
left-right i ×Ei -0.008 (0.007)
yj× left-right i -0.000 (0.017)
yj× left-right i × Ei 0.045* (0.026)
Constant 0.218*** (0.022)
Observations 1092
Participants 364
Notes: (i) Unit of analysis is an allocation by i to j; (ii) excluding allocations to self
(i=j); (iii) excluding participants who made zero allocations to everyone other than them-
selves; (iv) clustered standard errors at the individual level; (v) the significance levels are
indicated by: * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.001.
The first variable in Table 3.4 is a dummy variable for the earned treatment, represent-
ing how much money, on average, participant i allocated to participant j in the earned
8Only 10% of the sample were completely selfish, and we also test for a link between left-right and
selfishness using Model 1 in section B2 of Appendix B. In order to make sure we could safely exclude the
selfish participants, we tested for sample selection bias. First, we estimated a logit model to obtain an
estimate of the inverse Mills ratio, which we then included in the estimation of Model 1. A failure to reject
the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio was zero, allowed us to make this exclusion
(see section B3 in Appendix B for details).
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treatment with respect to the random treatment which is represented by the constant. Fi-
nal allocations are coded in terms of proportions, where a final allocation of 0.218 means
that, on average, participant i allocated 21.8% of total initial endowments (e 44) to partici-
pant j (e 9.59). The earned treatment dummy variable is not statistically significant which
indicates that, independent of initial endowments and the participant’s ideology, there was
no difference in the mean final allocations between the two treatments.
Focusing on the random treatment, none of the variables, i.e., yj, left-right i, left-right i×
yj, are statistically significant at the 5% significance level. This indicates that participant
j’s initial endowment or participant i’s ideology have no effect on participant i’s final
allocation to participant j in the random treatment. This is exactly what one would expect
since in the random treatment, a participant’s initial endowment is determined randomly,
or by luck.
The main effect we are interested in is that of left-right on AEE. Note that if the
triple interaction term between initial endowment of participant j, left-right and earned
treatment is statistically significant, this means that participants at different points on
the left-right axis, acknowledge earned entitlement differently. From Table 3.4, we see
that the coefficient for this triple interaction term is positive and statistically significant
at the 10% significance level. This indicates that, there is only a slight difference in how
participants acknowledged earned entitlement, depending on left-right. The further right on
the left-right axis, the more the participant will acknowledge earned entitlement. However,
the triple interaction term is only statistically significant at the 10% significance level,
indicating that left-right does not play a very important role when acknowledging earned
entitlement.
Table 3.5 presents the linear regression results for each of the four groupings of left-right.
As we can see from the first column of results, in the case of extreme-left participants, none
of the variables, apart from the constant, are statistically significant. Most importantly, the
interaction term yj×Ei is not statistically significant which indicates that the extreme-left
do not acknowledge earned entitlement at all. These participants demonstrate egalitarian
traits; evidence of which has been seen in Table 3.3, which showed that they allocated one-
quarter of total endowments to each group member, the most. Regardless of treatment and
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initial endowments, extreme-left participants, on average, divided the total initial endow-
ments among the other three group members almost completely equally, at a proportion of
0.213. This result is in agreement with the literature; Alesina and Giuliano (2011) found
that more left-wing individuals were pro-redistribution, and Margalit (2013) observed that
81% of Democrats were supportive of greater welfare spending, in comparison to only 22%
of Republicans.
Table 3.5: Regression analysis of allocations to others by left-right grouping.
Dependent variable = participant i’s final allocation to participant j
1st Group
(ext-left)
2nd Group
(left)
3rd Group
(centre)
4th Group
(right)
Ext-Left
vs.
The Rest
Ei
-0.044
(0.029)
-0.081***
(0.018)
-0.076***
(0.026)
-0.084**
(0.033)
-0.078***
(0.013)
yj
-0.015
(0.088)
0.019
(0.033)
-0.047
(0.051)
0.004
(0.062)
-0.002
(0.026)
yj × Ei 0.128(0.109)
0.288***
(0.064)
0.325***
(0.089)
0.362***
(0.108)
0.306***
(0.047)
Ext-Li
0.009
(0.025)
Ext-Li × Ei 0.034(0.032)
Ext-Li × yj -0.013(0.091)
Ext-Li × yj × Ei -0.178(0.118)
Constant 0.213***(0.024)
0.203***
(0.012)
0.217***
(0.017)
0.187***
(0.012)
0.204***
(0.008)
Observations 204 465 270 153 1092
Participants 68 155 90 51 364
Notes: (i) Unit of analysis is an allocation by i to j; (ii) excluding allocations to self (i = j); (iii) excluding partici-
pants who made zero allocations to everyone other than themselves; (iv) clustered standard errors at the individual
level; (v) significance levels are indicated by: * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.001.
The second column of results of Table 3.5 displays the results for “left-wing” participants.
The constant is similar to the extreme-left participants, which indicates that in the random
treatment, on average, left-wing participants’ final allocations were the same as for the
extreme-left. In the earned treatment, however, left-wing participants did acknowledge
earned entitlement as can be seen from the coefficient for the interacted term yj × E ,
which is positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The size of AEE
can be seen from the magnitude, which is 0.288.
In the third column, we find the results for “centre” participants. Once again, the
constant is similar to that of the extreme-left- and left-wing participants, therefore the
centre participants allocated similar amounts to the others in the random treatment, on
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average. These participants also acknowledged earned entitlement, with a size of 0.325.
The results for the right-wing participants can be seen in the fourth column of Table 3.5.
Although the magnitude of the constant appears to be lower, the 95% confidence intervals
slightly overlap across the groups. Thus, in the random treatment, mean allocations were
similar across the groups, on average. The sign and statistical significance of the interacted
term indicates that the right-wing participants acknowledged earned entitlement, with a
size of 0.362.
When we compare the results of the two ends of the left-right scale, the size of AEE
of the right-wing participants is approximately three times greater than for the extreme-
left participants. This signifies that right-wing people are likely to acknowledge earned
entitlement approximately three times more than the extreme-left.
In the last column of Table 3.5 are the results of a linear regression using Model 1 to
compare the extreme-left participants with the rest. Substituting in a dummy variable, Ext-
Li, that equals 1 if the participant is a 1 or a 2 on the left-right scale, and 0 otherwise, we
estimated an OLS regression. Using the estimates from Table 3.5, we calculated the p-values
of the slopes presented in Table 3.6. We examine slopes since they tell us the rate of change
in final allocations with respect to an increase in initial endowments. First, focusing on the
random treatment of both groups, we find that the slopes are not statistically significant.
This is confirmation of what we have seen in Table 3.4, in the random treatment, final
allocations are not impacted by initial endowment levels or left-right. From the last row,
we can see that the extreme-left participants did not acknowledge earned entitlement, while
the non-extreme-left participants did. So far, none of this is new information, it is simply
confirming our previous findings. The reason we estimated this last model was to test if
this difference in AEE between the two groups is statistically significant. This difference
Table 3.6: Slopes and AEE for the extreme-left and others.
Extreme-Left Not Extreme-Left
Slope P-value Slope P-value
Random Treatment yj + (Ext-Li × yj) 0.862 yj 0.941
Earned Treatment yj + (Ext-Li × yj) + (yj × Ei) + (Ext-Li × yj × Ei) 0.078 yj + (yj × Ei) 0.000
AEE (yj × Ei) + (Ext-Li × yj × Ei) 0.235 (yj × Ei) 0.000
Notes: (i) Slopes were derived from Model 1; (ii) AEE is the difference between the slopes of the two treat-
ments; (iii) in the case of the linear combinations, p-values were calculated using a t-statistic.
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is represented by the coefficient of Ext-Li × yj × Ei. From Table 3.5, we can see that the
coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero, meaning that the difference
between the two groups is not statistically significant.
We also estimated Model 1 to test if we were capturing the effect of left-right on self-
ishness instead of on distributive preferences. The only changes we made to the model
were rather than using the final allocations of participant i to participant j, and initial
endowments of participant j, we used the final allocation of participant i to himself/herself
and participant i’s initial endowment. In a nutshell, the triple interaction term is not sta-
tistically significantly different from zero. This means that a relationship between left-right
and selfishness cannot be established (please see section B2 in Appendix B for the results).
3.3.3 Political Ideology and Economic Status
Somewhat surprised by the weak effect of left-right on AEE, we decided to examine the
results by economic status, given the significant results found by Barr et al. (2015), Barr et
al. (2016), Margalit (2013) and Owens and Pedulla (2014). Following Barr et al.’s (2015)
categorization, we analyze the results for students, employed and unemployed participants
independently.
Table 3.7 presents the linear regression results, using Model 1, by economic status.
When looking at only students, we find that the triple interaction term becomes statis-
tically significant at the 5% significance level, while no other variables, apart from the
constant, are statistically significant. This indicates that left-right has a strong impact on
AEE for students. The results for the unemployed participants are displayed in the second
column. Apart from the constant, none of the variables are statistically significant. Un-
employed participants allocated, on average, 17.6% of final allocations, regardless of initial
endowments, treatment or left-right. Lastly, the triple interaction term is not statistically
significantly different from zero for the employed participants, meaning that left-right does
not have a strong impact on AEE for this group of participants either.
We controlled for economic status by adding in unemployed, a dummy variable which is 1
if the participant is unemployed, and is 0 if employed or a student, along with its interactions
with Ei and yj. Table B2 in section B5 of Appendix B shows that the coefficient of the triple
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interaction term, unemployed i × Ei × yj, is statistically significant at the 5% significance
level, while the triple interaction term with left-right i remains insignificant. This indicates
that economic status does affect AEE differently and is more important than left-right. In
addition, we also controlled for age in the regression for the student sample. As can be
seen from Table B3 in section B5 of Appendix B, the results remain robust. Although the
triple interaction term decreases to a 10% significance level, this means that excluding age,
the act of not being in the labour market has an impact on the effect of political ideology
on AEE.
Table 3.7: Regression analysis of allocations to others by economic status.
Dependent variable = participant i’s final allocation to participant j
Students Unemployed Employed
Earned treatment (Ei)
-0.039
(0.052)
0.038
(0.047)
-0.131**
(0.055)
j’s initial endowment (yj)
-0.052
(0.080)
0.073
(0.129)
-0.089
(0.155)
yj × Ei -0.039(0.170)
-0.087
(0.173)
0.414*
(0.212)
left-right i
-0.003
(0.005)
0.004
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.008)
left-right i × Ei -0.011(0.013)
-0.017
(0.012)
0.007
(0.013)
yj× left-right i 0.006(0.014)
0.003
(0.032)
0.009
(0.032)
yj× left-right i × Ei 0.078**(0.038)
0.051
(0.042)
-0.003
(0.048)
Constant 0.231***(0.027)
0.176***
(0.035)
0.257***
(0.040)
Observations 297 363 432
Participants 99 121 144
Notes: (i) Unit of analysis is an allocation by i to j; (ii) excluding allocations to self (i=j); (iii) excluding
participants who made zero allocations to everyone other than themselves; (iv) clustered standard errors at
the individual level; (v) the significance levels are indicated by: * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.001.
The results by economic status can also be seen graphically. Figure 3.1 displays the
slopes of the relationship between participant i’s allocation to participant j and participant
j’s initial endowment. The slopes are graphed for each value of left-right, for both the earned
and random treatments. Panel A presents the slopes for the full sample, whereas Panels
B–D display the slopes by economic status. All four panels show that for the random
treatment, the slopes are nearly zero, therefore all participants redistribute money equally,
regardless of their left-right placement or participant j’s initial endowment. However, in
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the earned treatment for the full sample, slopes are positive and increase the further to the
right. This is captured by the triple interaction term yj× left-right i×Ei in Table 3.4. Panel
B displays the slopes for the employed participants; the slopes do not vary much for either of
the treatments, indicating that AEE does not depend on left-right, as can be seen from the
insignificance of the triple interaction term in Table 3.7. The increasing distance between
the slopes for the two treatments for the unemployed, shown in Panel C, suggests that the
unemployed acknowledge earned entitlement more, the further right they are. However,
the triple interaction term of yj× left-right i × Ei in Table 3.7 indicates that AEE is never
significantly different from zero. The graph for students, in Panel D, captures a difference
between the two treatments; students at the extreme-left of the political spectrum do not
acknowledge earned entitlement, while those on the extreme-right do. Moreover, the size
of the effect is large, in comparison to the unemployed and the employed, as can be seen
from the magnitude of the triple interaction term in Table 3.7.
Figure 3.1: The Effect of Ideology on AEE.
Note: The linear functions graphed are derived from the estimated coefficients of the
models in Tables 3.4 and 3.7.
Table 3.8 displays the regression results of the extreme-left in comparison to everyone
else by economic status. The interaction term yj×Ei represents AEE for participants who
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are not extreme-left. In all three cases, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant
at the 5% significance level (or better). We have already seen this in the second, third and
Table 3.8: Regression analysis of allocations to others by economic status. Extreme-left vs. the rest.
Dependent variable = participant i’s final allocation to participant j
Students Unemployed Employed
Earned treatment (Ei)
-0.087***
(0.025)
-0.039
(0.024)
-0.094***
(0.020)
j’s initial endowment (yj)
-0.035
(0.047)
0.066
(0.043)
-0.031
(0.043)
yj × Ei 0.311***(0.084)
0.168**
(0.073)
0.393***
(0.079)
Ext-Li
0.002
(0.026)
-0.033
(0.033)
0.051
(0.048)
Ext-Li × Ei 0.065*(0.034)
0.067
(0.045)
-0.038
(0.061)
Ext-Li × yj 0.090(0.059)
0.069
(0.112)
-0.133
(0.177)
Ext-Li × yj × Ei -0.370***(0.125)
-0.242
(0.164)
0.040
(0.220)
Constant 0.215***(0.016)
0.197***
(0.016)
0.200***
(0.012)
Observations 297 363 432
Participants 99 121 144
Notes: (i) Unit of analysis is an allocation by i to j; (ii) excluding allocations to self (i=j); (iii) excluding
participants who made zero allocations to everyone other than themselves; (iv) clustered standard errors at
the individual level; (v) the significance levels are indicated by: * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.001.
fourth columns of Table 3.5. The magnitude of the coefficient is the largest for employed
participants, more than twice as large as that of the unemployed participants. This in-
dicates that non-extreme-left-wing participants who were employed were twice as likely
to acknowledge earned entitlement as those who were unemployed. The triple interaction
term between Ext-Li×yj×Ei demonstrates whether AEE changes depending on left-right.
As we can see, the coefficient for this term is negative and statistically significant at the
1% significance level for students. This means that students who self-report as extreme-left
acknowledge earned entitlement less than those who do not. However, for both the unem-
ployed and the employed participants, the coefficients for this triple interaction term are
not statistically significantly different from zero. This result demonstrates that political
ideology is only an important factor on AEE if the person is not in the labour market. Since
being employed or unemployed yields similar results, it is being in the labour market itself
that removes the importance of one’s ideology when acknowledging earned entitlement.
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Students can “afford” to behave according to their ideological values, whereas people in the
labour market are most likely driven by their economic status, as was found by Barr et al.
(2015) and Barr et al. (2016).
3.4 Discussion
The contribution of this paper is twofold. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time the effect of political left-right ideology has been studied on distributive preferences
in an experimental setting. Moreover, the study also captures the importance of economic
status when analyzing the effect of political ideology on AEE.
The experiment conducted was composed of two phases, a real-effort task followed
by a four-person dictator game. The experiment only differed in the treatment subjects
participated in. In the earned treatment, initial endowment values in the four-person
dictator game reflected how well the participants did in the real-effort task. In the random
treatment, the initial endowment values were assigned randomly, therefore the two parts
of the experiment were not connected in any way.
The findings show that political ideology has a weak effect on how people acknowledge
earned entitlement when considering the full sample, and it manifests itself in the two ends
of the left-right scale. Ideology had no effect on the distributive preferences in the random
treatment, since endowments were assigned by chance. It was only in the earned treatment
that the effect of ideology was triggered. The participants who were extreme-left, did not
acknowledge earned entitlement, exhibiting egalitarian traits. The rest of the participants
did acknowledge earned entitlement, adhering to meritocracy, an effect that increases the
further right on the left-right axis. When analyzing this effect by economic status, we found
that ideology has a strong impact on AEE for students, who can “afford” to act according
to their ideological values. Ideology had no effect on AEE for neither the employed nor
the unemployed participants, suggesting that their economic status plays a more important
role than their ideology.
Despite the growing evidence of material interest outweighing ideology in determining
distributive preferences, we provide evidence of an instance where ideology does have a
strong impact; namely, when we consider the preferences of students. Since they have not
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yet entered the labour market, they have nothing to lose and thus can “afford” to behave
in accordance with their ideological values. People already in the labour market, however,
are not afforded this privilege and thus behave according to their economic status, rather
than their ideological principles.
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4 | Education and the Non-Financial Em-
ployment Commitment in Times of
Economic Recession Among the Youth
in Spain
4.1 Introduction
If you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the rest of your
life, would you continue to work? For over six decades, researchers have been studying the
answers to this question and have found surprising results—the majority say they would.
It clearly indicates that there is more to a job than just the economic benefits. This non-
financial motivation for working may be caused by a sense of purpose, making them feel
useful, or because they simply enjoy what they do.
This so-called “lottery question” has been used as a proxy to measure this non-financial
employment commitment (which we also call the willingness to continue working in this
paper). Studies have only been carried out in seven countries, so this paper contributes to
the research by including a Southern European country for the first time—namely, Spain.
It is probably not very surprising to learn that in Japan and Germany, the willingness to
continue working is high, but we know nothing about countries that are not necessarily
known for their high work ethic (MOW, 1987).
Our focus on Spain is twofold. First of all, we are going to examine the effects of
the economic recession on the non-financial employment commitment. The most recent
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estimate of the unemployment rate in Spain, corresponding to the third term of 2016,
is 18.9% (INE, 2016b), so the non-financial commitment to work should be of extreme
importance. If people have a low non-financial commitment to work in a country that is in
the middle of an economic recession, it can have serious repercussions and prove difficult
to recuperate from the recession. It is not self-evident, how a recession affects the non-
financial commitment to work. Do people feel demotivated because of the tougher work
conditions and fewer job opportunities and are therefore less willing to continue working?
Alternatively, do they experience the sudden necessity to work which makes them more
willing to continue working? This effect has not yet been studied in great detail.
Second of all, there are not that many studies that concentrate on the effects of education
on the willingness to continue working. In a time with an increasing number of people
graduating from university, it is very important to know what effect different levels of
education have on the non-financial commitment to work. Policy makers should be aware
of these effects when making decisions since they could be indirectly affecting the non-
financial employment commitment of an entire generation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start by reviewing previous
literature on the lottery question and list our main hypotheses. Following that, in Section
3, we detail the data and the methodology. Then, in Section 4, we present our results and
conclude with a discussion in Section 5.
4.2 Literature Review
The first version of the “lottery question” was posed to an adult working male population by
Morse and Weiss (1955) in the US. They asked, Would you continue to work if you inherited
enough money to live comfortably without working?. Their findings show that 80% of the
participants said they would. This was followed up by a similar study done in the US by
Vecchio (1980), who asked, If you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you
would like for the rest of your life, would you continue to work or would you stop working?.
He found that 72% would continue to work; although a slight decrease, the majority still
chose to continue to work. Highhouse, Zickar and Yankelevich (2010) wanted to test if
this non-financial commitment to work continued to decrease, so they conducted a similar
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experiment. They found that 72.8% would continue working 1980-1993 and 68% would
continue to work 1994-2006; a very small decrease but still quite high.
Similar studies have been done in other countries. Paulsen (2008) includes an analysis
of many of these studies done up to that date—from 1955 to 2005. The 23 studies he
has listed were administered in seven different countries: the US, Great Britain, Israel,
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Belgium. In all cases, the majority chose to continue
to work, with the lowest being 59% among employed females in the US in 1971 and the
highest 93.4% among the adult population in Japan in 1987 (Paulsen, 2008; Campbell,
Converse & Rodgers, 1976; MOW, 1987). The majority of the studies had a non-financial
commitment to work of 70% or higher.
The samples used in previous research vary as some only focused on the employed,
others on just the unemployed, other samples were limited to only males or only females,
and others included the entire working population. Nonetheless, this did not seem to affect
the non-financial commitment to work that much, if at all. In all previous studies, the
majority always chose to continue working. In fact, in the US, Kaplan and Tausky (1974)
looked at the non-financial commitment to work among the hard-core unemployed and still
found that 80% would continue working. Likewise in Great Britain, Warr (1982) found that
out of the unemployed men who were actively seeking employment, 73% chose to continue
working; for women it was slightly lower at 68%. However, out of the unemployed men who
were not seeking work, only 33% said they would continue working; similar results were
found for women. This is the only time where the majority chose not to continue working.
A relationship between the level of education and the non-financial commitment to work
has been found in many studies. Researchers have found that higher-educated workers
are more likely to keep working than those with less education (Campbell et al., 1976;
Vecchio, 1980; Harpaz, 2002). Rose (2005) asked the lottery question in Britain in 2000,
and established that 78% of those with a degree or a higher degree would continue working,
67% of those with a higher qualification below a degree would continue working, 61% with
A levels (the last two years of high school), 64% with a secondary education and 53% with
no formal education would continue working. Tausky (1969) and the MOW (1987) have
separately identified that the less-educated place more importance on the economic and
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material conditions of working, whereas the higher-educated value expressive aspects of
working. Furthermore, the MOW (1987) found that people of low educational level tended
to define work negatively, while people of high educational level defined it positively. Lyman
(1955) extends this to the socioeconomic scale. People at the lower end of the scale are
more likely to stress the economic aspects of work and people at the upper end typically
stress the satisfaction in the work itself. All in all, education appears to have a positive
correlation with the willingness to continue working.
Dunn (2011), however, distinguishes between two measures of the non-financial employ-
ment commitment. One that focuses on a moral principle such as the Protestant Work
Ethic (PWE) Scale according to the Mirels and Garrett scale (Mirels & Garrett, 1971) and
another that emphasize preferences about work, such as the lottery question. He argues
that when using the moral principle measure, we find a decrease in the non-financial com-
mitment to work by level of education, such as in Furnham (1982)’s study where he finds
the mean PWE score to be 52 for the university-educated, 55 for the college-educated and
57 for secondary-educated participants. Rose (2005) draws similar conclusions which show
that using the lottery question provides the opposite results from using the PWE scale.
Dunn (2011) explains this inconsistency by claiming that the more educated score highly
on measures of work ethics that focus on preferences instead of morality because their
education can secure them enjoyable, “career” jobs. He supports his claim by using the
measure ‘Having almost any job is better than being unemployed’ to analyze the differences
by education level. Indeed, he finds that those with the highest level of education score the
lowest. Moreover, according to his results, the less educated are more morally committed
to work, less likely to want to continue working if not financially necessary, and more likely
to prefer a ‘bad’ job to unemployment. Even though the less educated are the most morally
committed to work, it is the more educated who always score the highest on the work ethic
measures which stress preference. According to Dunn (2011), one factor might be that the
lower educated might be more eager to avoid being dependent on state benefits (due to feel-
ings of low self-esteem and boredom), so they are willing to work low status jobs. Education
is what reduces the shame and boredom of unemployment and increases opportunities in
the job market. Another factor might be that those with a higher education are reporting
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a commitment to rewarding jobs that they know they can get with their education, which
is not the case for those with lower education. This claim is also supported by Schaufeli
(1992) who found that the well-educated can cope well with their unemployment since
they have more educational resources which they can make use of. The poorly-educated
school-leavers, on the other hand, are negatively affected by unemployment. Furthermore,
level of education is positively related to a number of characteristics such as self-esteem,
which is key for stress-buffering and a necessary coping characteristic if unemployed.
Highhouse et al. (2010) also noticed a connection between responses to the lottery
question and economic conditions. In periods of difficult economic times, more people are
willing to continue working. Their results also suggest that when the economy is prosperous,
one might feel more comfortable giving up working, but in tougher economic times, the
decision is unthinkable.
Given the previous literature, we propose two hypotheses. Participants with the highest
level of education will be the most willing to continue working, whereas those with the lowest
level of education will be the least willing to continue working. Additionally, since 2011
was a more difficult economic period in Spain than 2008, everyone will be more willing to
continue working in 2011 than in 2008. These two hypotheses will be analyzed using two
surveys described in the next section.
4.3 Method
4.3.1 Sample
The data used in the present study was taken from surveys entitled Observatory of Young
People’s Transition to the Labour Market conducted in 2008 and 2011 by the Valencian
Institute of Economic Research.1 Their target population sample were young people who
were searching for or had found their first job in the last 5 years. The Institute first ran this
survey in 1996, but only in the region of Valencia. In 1999 and 2002, they added the cities
of Madrid and Barcelona to the sample, and then expanded it even further in 2005, 2008
1We would like to thank The Valencian Institute of Economic Research for supplying us with their
survey data.
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Figure 4.1: The Willingness to Continue Working and the Unemployment Rate
Empty squares mark the points where the unemployment rate changes direction
Unemployment rate taken from the ILO—Labour Statistics database
and 2011, to include 16 (out of 19) regions in Spain. Figure 4.1 presents the willingness to
continue working in Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia, together with the overall mean and
the unemployment rate.
By including the unemployment rate for all of Spain in the same graph, the pattern is
not so clear. The willingness to continue to work seems to be positively correlated with
the unemployment rate in the city of Madrid and the region of Valencia for the period
of 1996 to 2008. In these two areas, in 1996 and 1999, the unemployment rate, along
with the willingness to continue working, are quite high. The unemployment rate starts
to decrease from 22.1% in 1996 to 10.6% in 2001; likewise, the willingness to continue
working in Valencia begins to decrease from 60% to 43% in 2002. The unemployment
rate then slightly increases to 11.5% in 2002 and 2003, as does the willingness to continue
working (to 50% in 2005). The unemployment rate starts to decrease, once again, and
reaches 8.3% in 2007; similarly, the willingness to continue working decreases to 27% in
2008. The last three years correspond to the deep economic recession with a very high
unemployment rate and many diverse responses to the lottery question in different Spanish
regions. But, generally, the willingness to continue working has the same pattern as the
unemployment rate, which confirms the conclusions of Highhouse et al. (2010) that people
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are more willing to continue to work in tougher economic times. The willingness to work
in Barcelona behaves very differently from Madrid and Valencia and that is why the data
will be studied separately for each region in our analysis.
The analyzed data sets do not have panel data structure. The two samples are similar,
but they are not identical. The 2008 survey was conducted in 12 Spanish provinces and
used province as a characteristic of the population, whereas the 2011 survey focused on
cities and included 34 Spanish cities. In order to homogenize the two samples, we created a
common region variable and only included in our sample observations from regions common
to both samples (8 regions), which was 88.8% of the entire sample.
In our sample, 2,999 people answered the lottery question in 2008 and 1,994 answered
it in 2011. Table 4.1 displays the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis.
The first three blocks present summary statistics of socio-demographic variables and the
last block is devoted to responses to the lottery question. The comparison of 2008 and
2011 confirm the similarity of the two sub-samples regarding age, gender and education.
The interpretation of the mean of the dummy variables is simply the proportion of the
sample with those characteristics. We can see that the overall mean age was 23.22 (the
survey is only given to participants 16–30 of age) and that 55% of our sample were females.
With respect to education, 12% of our sample had a primary education or less, 23% had
a university education (or less but more than secondary) and the rest (65%) either had a
vocational or a secondary education (or less but more than primary).
Since we are dealing with a sample of young people, we should ask whether our results
can be compared to previous studies. Most researchers have found that younger participants
are usually more willing to continue working with respect to older participants. Campbell
et al. (1976) noted that the choice to give up their job increases with age and Warr (1982)
observed that among younger employees (full-time employed men), 76% would continue
working, while only 69% of men of all ages said they would continue to work. He obtained
the same result for women; among younger female employees, 80%, rather than 65% for
females overall, would continue to work; Highhouse et al. (2010) also support this finding.
This suggests that, if anything, the willingness to continue working should be even higher
in our sample than in previous studies.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics of explanatory variables
2008 2011 Overall
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Age 22.84 3.61 23.94 3.68 23.22 3.67 16 30
Female (1=yes) 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.50 0 1
Primary education (1=yes) 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33 0 1
University education (1=yes) 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0 1
Total number of jobs respondent has had 2.16 1.34 2.05 1.26 2.12 1.31 1 6
Total number of months searched for jobs since age 16 7.45 13.98 12.95 17.73 9.37 15.61 0 134
Number of family members working (including the respondent) 2.42 1.10 2.07 0.98 2.30 1.07 0 10
Student (1=yes) 0.38 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0 1
Employed (1=yes) 0.67 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.63 0.48 0 1
Foreign (1=yes) 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.28 0 1
Married/in a relationship (1=yes) 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38 0 1
Father’s education level:
Secondary education (1=yes) 0.40 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49 0 1
Vocational education (1=yes) 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30 0 1
University education (1=yes) 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0 1
Respondent’s region:
Valencia (1=yes) 0.39 0.49 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48 0 1
Andalucia (1=yes) 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0 1
Basque Country (1=yes) 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 0 1
Aragon (1=yes) 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0 1
Galicia (1=yes) 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 0 1
Madrid (1=yes) 0.06 0.23 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.27 0 1
Murcia (1=yes) 0.12 0.33 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.30 0 1
Year 2011 (1=yes) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.35 0.48 0 1
2008 2011
Lottery question Categ. % ofrespon. Categ.
% of
respon.
Would definitely continue working 1 13.5% 1 14.1%
Would continue working 2 16.8% 2 15.9%
Indifferent 3 8.8% 3 13.1%
Would not continue working 4 22.7% 4 26.5%
Would definitely not continue working 5 38.2% 5 30.3%
4.3.2 Methodology
Our dependent variable which measures the willingness to continue to work is the lottery
question. Participants were asked to agree or disagree with: If I won the lottery where I
wouldn’t have to work for the rest of my life, I would not work. Participants chose their
answer from one to five: Very much disagree, or in other words, the participant chooses to
continue working, Somewhat disagree, Indifferent, Somewhat agree, and lastly Very much
agree, where the participant chooses to stop working.
Since the outcomes of the lottery question have a natural rank to them and are coded by
numbers one to five, one being the “very much disagree” response, we used an ordered logit
model to analyze the Spanish dataset (Long, 1997). In this model, the explained variable
has five possible ordered responses as explained above and the explanatory variables are
those included in Table 4.1. Apart from the variables listed in Table 4.1, we also included
the interaction terms between all variables and the year dummy variable equal to one for
observations included in the 2011 survey, with a total of 43 variables in our ordered logit
model.
The observed answer yi, by individual i, is defined for N individuals in our ordered logit
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model by the measurement equation:
yi = m if τm−1 ≤ y∗i < τm for i = 1, 2, ..., N and m = 1, 2, ..., 5, (4.1)
where the τ ’s are parameters to be estimated called thresholds, and y∗i is a latent variable
representing the propensity not to work having won the lottery. The structural model for
this variable is defined as:
y∗i = x
′
iβ + εi for i = 1, 2, ..., N, (4.2)
where xi is a row vector with the ith observation of the explanatory variables (presented
in Table 4.1), β is a column vector of structural coefficients and εi is an error term with a
logistic distribution. Under simple identification conditions, this model can be estimated
by the maximum likelihood method (Long, 1997).
In the results section, we do not report the marginal effects as they depend on the values
of explanatory variables and can even change signs with a change in these variables. Thus,
we report estimated coefficients of our ordered logit model and then use changes in pre-
dicted probabilities caused by changes in explanatory variables to illustrate the relationship
between the willingness to work and specific explanatory variables.
The predicted probability that yi = m (m = 1, 2, ..., 5) given specific values of our
explanatory variables xvi is:
P̂ r(yi = 1|xvi ) = F (τˆ1 − xvi ′βˆ) (4.3)
P̂ r(yi = m|xvi ) = F (τˆm − xvi ′βˆ)− F (τˆm−1 − xvi ′βˆ) for m = 2, 3, 4 (4.4)
P̂ r(yi = 5|xvi ) = 1− F (τˆ4 − xvi ′βˆ) (4.5)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution and τˆ , βˆ are
estimated parameters. The discrete change in the predicted probability for a change in one
of the explanatory variables xki from the start value xS to the end value xE is defined as:
∆Pr(yi = m | xvi )
∆xk
= Pr(yi = m | xvi , xki = xE)− Pr(yi = m | xvi , xki = xS) (4.6)
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where Pr(yi = m | xvi , xki) is the probability that yi = m given specific values of our
explanatory variables xvi except for the kth variable xki whose effect is analyzed. Its value
is set to the start and end values respectively.
4.4 Results and Discussion
As the two samples corresponding to 2008 and 2011 are similar, we pooled them together
to be able to test changes in estimated coefficients between the two years. That is why
we created a dummy variable for the year 2011 and interacted it with all the explanatory
variables from Table 4.1 and included it in the model.
Table 4.2 presents the estimated coefficients β from (4.2) obtained by maximum like-
lihood estimation. The first column contains the names of the explanatory variables, the
second and third columns display the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the 2008
results, and the last two columns present the estimated coefficients and standard errors of
interactions with the 2011 dummy variable.
Table 4.2: Ordered Logit Results
Dependent variable = lottery question 2008 Results Interaction with 2011dummy variable
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Age -0.033** (0.015) 0.015 (0.023)
Female -0.305*** (0.082) 0.350*** (0.132)
Primary education 0.376*** (0.145) -0.450** (0.218)
University education -0.274*** (0.104) -0.313* (0.167)
Total number of jobs respondent has had -0.108*** (0.032) 0.053 (0.054)
Total number of months searched for jobs since age 16 0.010*** (0.003) -0.008* (0.004)
Number of family members working (including the respondent) 0.065 (0.041) -0.114 (0.070)
Student -0.071 (0.101) -0.334** (0.159)
Employed -0.122 (0.102) -0.053 (0.151)
Foreign 0.161 (0.152) -0.678*** (0.251)
Married/in a relationship 0.133 (0.122) 0.023 (0.175)
Father’s education level:
Secondary education -0.260*** (0.099) 0.146 (0.158)
Vocational education -0.431*** (0.155) 0.205 (0.228)
University education -0.485*** (0.133) 0.295 (0.204)
Respondent’s region:
Valencia -0.185 (0.148) 1.154*** (0.222)
Andalucia -0.819*** (0.184) 1.482*** (0.282)
Basque Country -0.464*** (0.179) 1.222*** (0.324)
Aragon -0.718*** (0.205) 1.038*** (0.340)
Galicia -0.738*** (0.189) 1.311*** (0.268)
Madrid -0.194 (0.200) 1.386*** (0.267)
Murcia -0.534*** (0.164) 1.127*** (0.258)
Year 2011 -1.463** (0.593) N/A N/A
Observations 3424
Log pseudolikelihood -5041.8266
AIC 10177.65
BIC 10466.17
Notes: ***,**,*: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
A direct interpretation of the estimated coefficients presented in Table 4.2 is not possible
since the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability to choose a specific
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outcome depends on the values of all explanatory variables, as can be seen in (4.3)–(4.5).
However, it can be seen that the explanatory variables are generally significant at the 5%
significance level. Therefore, the probability of choosing a specific response depends on
the exact age, gender, education level, number of jobs had, number of months searched
for work, father’s education level, region and the year. Nevertheless, the effect of gender,
education level, number of months searching for work, being a student or a foreigner and the
region on the willingness to continue working changes in 2011 because the corresponding
interactions with the 2011 dummy variable are significant at 5%. In order to analyze the
effects in more detail, we will use the changes in probabilities defined in (4.6).
Detailed below is the interpretation of the effects of different explanatory variables on
the predicted probabilities of the extreme responses “very much disagree”, interpreted as
would definitely continue working, and “very much agree”, interpreted as would definitely
not continue working. We compare the results for the regions of Madrid and Catalonia since
the participants in these regions responded very differently within our sample. Nevertheless,
generally, the rest of the sample fall between the two, but the majority of the other regions
had results more similar to the Madrid region. According to (4.3)–(4.5), the predicted
probabilities are computed for specific values of explanatory variables. That is why we
define a benchmark individual and analyze changes of some variables with respect to their
characteristics. The benchmark individual is defined as a woman whose father’s education
is at the secondary level, is not a student, not employed, not foreign and not in a long-term
relationship, and all continuous control variables are held at the mean. These characteristics
were chosen because these values were prevalent in each corresponding variable.
Figure 4.2 displays the effect of age on the predicted probability of definitely working
or not working in 2008 and 2011 by education level. In Figure 4.2a, we see that in 2008,
the youngest people with a primary education have a high probability (around 60%) of
choosing that they would definitely not continue working. Contrary to Highhouse et al.
(2010), this probability slightly decreases as age increases (to approximately 45% at 30
years of age). The youngest respondents in Highhouse et al.’s sample, however, were 21, as
opposed to 16, so perhaps the two samples are incomparable. Two studies that did include
younger respondents were Warr (1982)’s, which found evidence coinciding with Highhouse
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et al.’s, and Kaplan and Tausky (1974) whose results are comparable to ours. What is
more, Kaplan and Tausky’s sample included respondents who were unemployed and quite
poor, depicting the economic situation in our sample more accurately than other studies.
Comparing the youngest and the oldest age, there is a steady decline in the probability
of definitely not working and the probability of working mildly increases from 5% to 10%.
Results are similar for both analyzed regions in 2008, but not for 2011, as can be seen in
Figure 4.2b. The results for the Madrid region in 2011 are similar to 2008. For Catalonia,
however, the difference between the two probabilities is much smaller in 2011 than in 2008.
Younger people with a primary education still start off with a higher probability of choosing
to definitely not work, but it is less than 30% while the Madrid region starts off almost
twice as high.
Figure 4.2c shows that the difference between the two responses is not as large for the
secondary- or vocational-educated respondents, as it is for primary-educated respondents.
Approximately 50% of 16-year-olds report they would definitely not continue working which
decreases with age. This is approximately 10% lower than among the primary-educated.
The percentage of 16-year-olds that respond they would definitely continue working is
similar, but perhaps slightly higher than the primary-educated respondents. In 2011, the
results for the secondary- or vocational-educated are very similar to the primary-educated,
as can be seen from Figure 4.2d.
Figures 4.2e and 4.2f present the predicted probabilities of working for the university-
educated respondents. In terms of slopes, it is the same as in the primary- or secondary-
educated respondents, but the gap between definitely working and definitely not working is
much smaller among the university-educated respondents than for the rest. The main dif-
ference to note is that in 2011, university-educated respondents from Catalonia responded
differently not only from their counterparts from the Madrid region, or from how they re-
sponded in 2008, but also from how the primary- or secondary-educated respondents from
Catalonia responded in 2011. More young university-educated Catalans prefer to definitely
continue working than to definitely not continue working (30% in comparison to 20%), and
this percentage increases with age.
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Figure 4.2: The Effect of Age on the Willingness to Work in 2008 and 2011 by Level of
Education.
Figure 4.3 presents the effect of a different variable, namely, the total number of jobs,
on the probability of continuing to work. Starting with Figure 4.3a, we can see that a
primary-educated person that has only held one job in their lifetime has a probability of
approximately 50% of choosing to definitely not continue working, but this probability
diminishes rapidly with each additional job, reaching 40% after six jobs. The probability
of definitely continuing to keep working starts very low at less than 10% and increases
very slowly with number of previous jobs. To the best of our knowledge, nothing in the
literature has been reported about the effect the number of jobs has on one’s willingness to
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Figure 4.3: The Effect of the Number of Jobs Had on the Willingness to Work in 2008 and
2011 by Level of Education.
work. Once again, generally, the results for the two regions are similar in 2008, but differ
in 2011, while the Madrid region results are consistent over the two years as can be seen
from Figure 4.3b. In 2011 in Catalonia, the willingness to continue working increases
by more than twice as much and the probability of definitely not working decreases by
approximately 50% in comparison to Catalonia in 2008 as well as in comparison to Madrid
in 2011. Secondary- and vocational-educated respondents have similar responses as the
primary-educated in 2008, with a smaller difference between the two responses as shown in
Figures 4.3a and 4.3c.
The gap between the two responses is smaller for university-educated respondents than
for less-educated individuals; similar to what we found with the effect of age (Figure 4.2).
Only 40% of respondents with one job say they would definitely not continue working
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as compared to 50% of secondary-educated individuals and 60% of primary-educated re-
spondents. Once again, we find a difference in responses among the university-educated
Catalans in 2011. The probability of the response, I would definitely continue working,
for university-educated individuals in Catalonia with one previous job starts around 30%
which is almost double the same probability for less-educated people. This can be seen in
Figures 4.3e and 4.3f. This probability increases with the number of jobs to approximately
30% for individuals with six jobs.
Figure 4.4 presents the effect of the number of months searching for work in 2008 and
2011 by level of education. Figure 4.4a, displays the effect of the number of months a
primary-educated respondent has spent searching for a job, on the willingness to work.
Respondents not having spent any time searching for work start off with a 50% probability
of definitely not working which then dramatically increases to approximately 80% after 10
years of searching for a job. The probability of definitely continuing to work starts at a
10% probability and decreases to almost 0% after 10 years. As is evident from Figure 4.4a,
this effect is similar in both the Madrid region as in the Catalonia region. For the Madrid
region in 2011 (Figure 4.4b), the probability of definitely not working starts at the same
percentage as in 2008 but it increases at a much slower pace reaching a probability of 60%
after 10 years. The probability of definitely not working in Catalonia in 2011, is much lower
than in 2008 as well as in comparison to Madrid in 2011; it begins at approximately 25%
and increases to about 30%. It is clear that the recession created a sense of need for work
in both regions, but definitely more so in Catalonia. As can be seen from Figures 4.4c and
4.4d, the slopes for respondents with a secondary or vocational education follow a similar
pattern to the primary-educated respondents, presented in Figures 4.4a and 4.4b.
Figures 4.4e and 4.4f illustrate that in 2008, the difference between the probability
of definitely working and definitely not working decreases even more for the university-
educated respondents. Someone who has never had to search for work has a 35% probability
of saying they would definitely not work, whereas someone with a primary-education starts
at a 50% probability. This unwillingness to work increases for the university-educated
participants reaching almost a 70% probability after 10 years of searching. In the Madrid
region, in tougher economic times (2011), the increase in the willingness to definitely not
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work is milder than in 2008. In Catalonia in 2011, the predicted probabilities indicate that
more respondents who had spent no months searching for work would definitely continue
working than not, but this decreases with the number of months. So the effect of the
number of months spent searching for work is still negative on the willingness to continue
working for university-educated respondents in 2011, but the individuals in Catalonia start
off wanting to work more.
Figure 4.4: The Effect of the Number of Months Searching for Work on the Willingness to
Work in 2008 and 2011 by Level of Education.
Figure 4.5 presents the effect of the number of family members, including the respon-
dent, working on the willingness to continue working by education level. As can be seen
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from Figure 4.5a, the probability of definitely not working for primary-educated partici-
pants in 2008 increases with each additional family member working. The probability starts
at 50% where no one is working and increases to around 60% where 10 family members are
working. The probability of definitely continuing to work starts at 10% and decreases to
approximately 0%. The results are very similar for both regions in 2008. In 2011
Figure 4.5: The Effect of the Number of Family Members Working on the Willingness to Work
in 2008 and 2011 by Level of Education.
(Figure 4.5b), however, the slopes reverse in both regions. In the Madrid region, primary-
educated participants with no family members working still start with a 50% probability of
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choosing to definitely not work, but this probability decreases with each additional family
member working. We see a similar effect in Catalonia, but the percentage of people who
definitely do not want to continue working is much lower at 30% than the Madrid region
(Figure 4.5b). This change in slopes between 2008 and 2011 (Figures 4.5a and 4.5b) might
be due to the feeling of having to help out your family in an economic recession as well as
the added pressure from other family members to work, thus spreading the burden.
The effect of the number of family members working is similar for secondary- or vocational-
educated respondents as for those with a primary education. In 2008, once again, we see
that the difference between the two responses decreases, but not for 2011. It appears that
the recession had a similar effect on primary- and secondary-educated respondents as can
be seen comparing Figures 4.5a with 4.5c and 4.5b with 4.5d. Nevertheless, the gap is
smaller than for primary-educated people.
In Figures 4.5e and 4.5f, we see the same pattern. The gap between the two extremes
is much smaller for university-educated respondents in 2008 and the responses of these
university-educated Catalans differ from everyone in 2011. Out of people whose family
members, including themselves, are not working, 30% report they would definitely want to
continue working; this effect increases with each additional working family member.
If we focus only on 2008, corresponding to the graphs on the left-hand side (that is
a, c and e) of Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, we can see that the gap between the two
opposite responses, presented as upward and downward curves, decreases if we move from
the primary-educated to the university-educated respondents, that is from figures a to e.
This confirms our first hypothesis that the willingness to continue working increases by
education level. However, we do not observe such a clear result for 2011, corresponding
to a severe economic recession. The responses of primary- and secondary-educated people
change markedly with respect to 2008, but there is no clear difference between them in
2011. This can be seen by comparing figures b and d of Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.
Nevertheless, the first hypothesis is confirmed for 2011, if we compare university- (figures
f) and non-university-educated people (figures b and d), as we observe the same decreasing
gap described above.
For our benchmark individual in 2008, the effect of age seems to be very small (one year
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decreases the probability of definitely not working by 0.8%). The same goes for the number
of total jobs - each additional job decreases the probability of definitely not working by
approximately 2.5% and each additional family member working increases the probability
of definitely not working by approximately 1.5%. The probability of definitely not working
for each additional month spent searching for work, however, increases by 2.4%. Therefore,
the explanatory variable that seems to have the most effect on the willingness to work is
the number of months spent searching for work. To demonstrate just how large this change
in one’s willingness to continue working is, consider that the effect that one month has on
one’s willingness to continue working is the equivalent of having worked an additional job,
or almost two additional family members working, or as 3 years, in terms of age.
4.5 Conclusion
When looking at the overall percentage of participants who said they would continue to
work if they won the lottery, 30.14% say they would continue working in 2008 and 29.5%
in 2011. These values are much lower than the original 60% found in the region of Valencia
in 1996, which itself is slightly lower than what has been found in other countries. It
is difficult to say why the results for Spain are so different in comparison to all other
countries in previous research. It could be due to cultural or religious differences or due to
the volatility of its economy.
In spite of having the same unemployment rates, the willingness to continue working in
2011 was less than half of what it was in 1996. This, along with the overall pattern, suggests
there might be a downward, long-term trend. Our findings show that the willingness to
continue working in Spain is very unstable as is the economic situation, which can be seen
from the fluctuating unemployment rate. A positive relationship seems to exist between the
willingness to continue working and the unemployment rate: the higher the unemployment
rate, the higher the willingness to continue working. However, this relationship appears to
end in 2008, when a severe economic recession began.
One reason why 2011 is different could be that the participants who are answering the
survey in 2011 belong to a different cohort. Those who were 16–30 in 1996 are 31–45 in
2011, and those who answered the surveys in 2008 and 2011 grew up during the first wave
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of high unemployment rates. These tougher economic times may have caused them to
have a lower non-financial commitment to work. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) found that
individuals who experienced low stock market returns in their life had lower willingness
to take financial risk, less likely to invest in the stock market, and be pessimistic about
their future stock returns. It is not hard to imagine that this could be extended to the
non-financial employment commitment as well. However, we find a link between times of
need and a high willingness to continue working, so if anything, growing up during tougher
economic times should have a positive effect on the willingness to continue working.
A second possible reason for the differences between the 2008 and 2011 results could
be due to the reoccurring high unemployment rates. Highhouse et al. (2010) examined
the changes in the willingness to continue working with respect to the economic situation,
but the unemployment rate in the US never exceeded 11% and the willingness to continue
working never dropped below 65%, so it is difficult to draw any conclusions.
If we focus on the two hypotheses we analyze in this paper, the first relating a higher level
of education to a higher willingness to work, and the second hypothesis relating tougher
economic times to a higher willingness to work, we can say the following. The analysis of
the effect of education on predicted probabilities, shows us that the difference between the
two opposite responses, definitely continue working and definitely not continue working,
decreases as education level increases in 2008, supporting our first hypothesis that people
with a higher education level are more willing to continue working. In 2008, the willingness
to continue working increased by education level, with the primary-educated respondents
being the least willing to continue working and the university-educated respondents being
the most willing to continue working. In 2011, however, it appears that the recession
had the same effect on both primary- and secondary-educated respondents and no clear
difference is observed between them. Nevertheless, the difference between university- and
non-university-educated people goes in the same direction as in 2008. It is of course not
surprising that the university-educated respondents are willing to continue working the
most. Saad (2005) states that high levels of education (and income) coincide with a high
percentage of people who love their jobs. It is possible that university-educated people
enjoy their jobs more since they have better working conditions and might be working in
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the field that they studied, and presumably enjoy.
Regarding our second hypothesis which focuses on tougher economic times, we can see
evidence of this by simply comparing the 2008 graphs with the 2011 graphs for Catalonia
in Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. Respondents of all education levels are more willing to
continue working in 2011 than in 2008. The effect of the recession on the willingness to
continue working for the Madrid region is not as clear. Furthermore, one reason why it
appears that the recession had the same effect on both primary- and secondary-educated
respondents could be that the primary-educated were hit the hardest in the recession, thus
feeling the “need” to work more than the secondary-educated respondents.
The difference in results found between Catalonia and the Madrid region in 2011 could
be attributed to two factors. First of all, 2010 saw a rise in Catalan nationalism. When, in
2010, a constitutional court rejected a new statute giving Catalonia more autonomy, more
than one million people demonstrated in the streets of Barcelona (“Catalan protesters rally
for greater autonomy in Spain”, 2010). That same year, Artur Mas, the leader of a pro-
independence party, was elected president of the Catalan government. To the best of our
knowledge, how a sudden increase in nationalism affects the non-financial work commitment
has not yet been studied. Nevertheless, a strong feeling of building a new state could have
a positive effect on the willingness to work.
A second reason for the difference in results between Catalonia and Madrid in 2011,
might be that Catalonia endured worse economic conditions than the Madrid region, which
can be seen in Figure 4.6. Figure 4.6a presents the unemployment rate for both regions
which was similar in 2008, but from 2009 on it increased more in Catalonia than in Madrid.
The average salary per capita, as shown in Figure 4.6b, follows the same pattern; in 2008,
the average salary is similar between the two regions, but then it increased more in Madrid
than in Catalonia. Lastly, as Figure 4.6c illustrates, the number of foreclosures increased
much more in Catalonia than in Madrid. This explanation, would be in line with our
second hypothesis which addresses tougher economic times.
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Figure 4.6: Economic Conditions in Catalonia and Madrid
The explanatory variable that had the biggest impact on the willingness to continue
working was the number of months spent searching for work. As was mentioned earlier, the
effect of one month of searching for work is equivalent to aging 3 years. Therefore, policy
makers should focus on decreasing the amount of time people spend searching for work in
order to avoid this strong negative impact on the non-financial work commitment.
This paper is a good start to analyzing the non-financial commitment to work in Spain.
Further research is necessary to decipher why the year 2011 is different from the rest and
why the willingness to continue working increased so much for Catalonia in comparison
to other regions in Spain. Conducting a similar study in a country with a comparable
economic history would be very insightful and future responses to the lottery question in
Spain will be of great interest.
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5 | Conclusions
Given the most recent economic recession and its great impact on the Spanish economy,
we focused on the most vulnerable subpopulation: the youth of Spain. We addressed three
points of concern. First of all, we need to be aware of students’ job preferences when they
are about to enter the labour market. This is important so that companies, policymakers,
and students themselves can take this into consideration, better preparing for a realistic
matching of young job-seekers and jobs offered. Second of all, the effect of ideology on
distributive preferences and how it relates to economic status is of importance so that
political parties can better represent the people. Third of all, the effect of the recession on
intrinsic motivation, and analyzing key factors, is very important so that policymakers can
see where they need to make the biggest improvements in order to avoid a generation with
very low intrinsic motivation.
In Chapter 2, we elicited students’ job preferences using a DCE, a more quantitative
and rigorous method than had been previously used. We conducted it among business and
economics students at five universities in three different countries. The most important
job attribute, across all universities and countries, was long-term career prospect at the
company. This is consistent with previous literature, even with a study conducted in
Malaysia (Lim & Soon, 2006). Moreover, students who have a high preference for a long-
term career opportunity have lower preferences for salary.
Education opportunity is another important attribute for all students, regardless of type
of university or country. This indicates that students realize that in today’s competitive
market, it is vital to keep working on one’s employability. Perhaps due to the sense of
insecurity caused by the most recent economic recession, students feel they need to keep
investing in their studies.
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A cultural difference was found between Spanish and non-Spanish universities. Specif-
ically, commuting time was found to be very important among Spanish students, but not
important at all among non-Spanish students. This could be due to the ease of mobility
among Czech or Germany students, i.e., whereas the Spanish youth tend to live with their
families and are less likely to move out, young people in Czech and Germany would simply
move closer to the job.
Additionally, a difference between Spanish and non-Spanish students was found due to
the large difference in unemployment rates. In Spain, the importance of having a permanent
contract is very high, whereas in the Czech Republic and Germany it is less important.
Furthermore, students at the two public universities in Spain, who are likely to have a
harder time finding a job than the rest, are willing to forgo a better work environment in
order to obtain a permanent contract.
The only difference found between public and private university students was in the
importance of a work environment. Among private university students, work environment
was more important, likely due to the fact that they intend to work at “A-level” companies.
The least important job attribute, among all students, was a flexible schedule. This
is most probably due to two factors. Firstly, younger people have a lower need for a
flexible schedule, that need increases with age due to family obligations. Secondly, when
first entering the labour market, young job-seekers are aware that they will not be able
to dictate their own schedule, but will have to show their high work commitment to the
company.
Studies like these can reveal what job characteristics are important to young job-seekers.
Consequently, companies can try to offer characteristics that are important, if they can, or
at least lower the probability that they will offer a characteristic that young job-seekers find
unimportant. In addition, students should reflect on their preferences and learn about the
labour market conditions, perhaps adjusting their preferences to more realistic standards.
For example, young people in Spain are not very likely to receive an offer with a permanent
contract when first entering the labour market. Lastly, policymakers need to be aware
of both students’ job preferences and labour market conditions, so they can help better
match job-seekers to jobs. For instance, they could offer a tax break to companies offering
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permanent contracts to young people.
The contribution of Chapter 3 is twofold. First of all, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time that the effect of political ideology on distributive preferences has been
studied in an experimental setting. Second of all, the importance of economic status on
the effect of political ideology and distributive preferences has also been captured in this
study.
The experiment used in Chapter 3 was composed of two parts. First, students had to
participate in a real-effort task and then in a four-person dictator game. In the earned
treatment, the initial endowments of the four-person dictator game reflected how well they
did in the first task, i.e., the person who ranked first started off with the highest initial
endowment value. In the random treatment, the initial endowment values were assigned
randomly.
The results show that political ideology has a weak effect on AEE, when considering
the sample as a whole. The participants who consider themselves as extreme-left do not
acknowledge earned entitlement, exhibiting egalitarian traits. The rest of the participants,
those who consider themselves a three or higher on the left-right scale, do acknowledge
earned entitlement, and this effect increases the further right on the left-right scale.
When analyzing this effect by economic status, we find a very interesting result. Ideol-
ogy has a strong impact on AEE for students, but no impact for employed or unemployed
participants. Since no difference was found between the unemployed and employed partic-
ipants, it is being in the labour market itself, that plays an important role. As students
have not yet entered the labour market, they can “afford” to behave in accordance with
their ideological values, strongly believing something without experiencing the “reality” of
it, if you will. Employed and unemployed participants, on the other hand, cannot afford
this “privilege” and behave according to their economic status rather than their political
ideology.
In Chapter 4, we studied the effect of the economic recession on the non-financial
employment commitment by level of education. Responses to the “lottery question” in
2008 and 2011 were analyzed. To begin with, the overall percentage of who say they would
continue working is approximately 30%, much lower than had been found in previous studies
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(70–90%). Without further research, it is difficult to pinpoint the reason why it is so much
lower in Spain. It could be due to cultural or religious differences, or due to the instability
of the Spanish economy. There appears to be a positive relation between the willingness to
continue working and the unemployment rate; however, this relation ended with the most
recent economic recession in 2008.
The effect of education on the non-financial employment commitment was examined
using predicted probabilities for the region of Madrid, which has similar results as the rest
of Spain, and for the region of Catalonia. In 2008, the gap between the two most extreme
responses, would definitely continue working and would definitely not continue working,
decreased by level of education. Therefore, our hypothesis that the willingness to continue
working increases with education is true. Respondents with a primary education were
the least likely to continue working, while respondents with a university education were
the most likely to continue working. However, in 2011, the difference between primary-
educated respondents and secondary-educated respondents is not very clear, but there is
still a difference between university- and non-university-educated respondents. Since people
with a university degree invested in their education, they most likely enjoy their jobs and
have better work conditions.
The effect of the recession increased the willingness to continue working in Catalonia,
but the effect for the region of Madrid is not very clear. The reason for this difference
in regions could be due to two factors. Since 2008, there has been a rise in Catalan
nationalism. Specifically, in 2010, the constitutional court rejected giving more autonomy
to the region of Catalonia, resulting in one million protestors in the streets. A few months
later, a pro-independence party was elected into the Catalan government. As far as we
know, no research has been done on nationalism and how it relates to the non-financial
employment commitment, but it is not hard to imagine that it could have a positive effect
on the willingness to work. The second reason for this regional difference could be that
Catalonia had worse economic conditions than Madrid in 2011. Catalonia saw a larger
increase in unemployment than Madrid, in addition to a larger increase in the number of
foreclosures, as well as a larger decrease in salaries. This explanation is in accordance with
our second hypothesis that the non-financial employment commitment increases in tougher
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economic times.
We also compared the effect of various socio-demographic variables on the non-financial
employment commitment to examine which one had the largest impact. The willingness
to work increases with age; a similar effect is seen with the total number of jobs had. Each
additional job increases the non-financial employment commitment, perhaps realizing the
need to work. The number of months spent searching for work has the opposite effect, with
large decreases in the willingness to work for each additional month. However, the severity
of the impact decreases in 2011, when there is a larger need to work. Lastly, the number
of family members working has a negative effect on the willingness to work in 2008, but a
positive one in 2011. In times of economic recession, the burden is shared by all, thus, if
most of my family members are working, I am more likely to choose to continue working
as well. In terms of the size of the effect of these socio-demographic variables, the number
of months searching for work had the largest impact on the non-financial employment
commitment. Therefore, this should be of the greatest importance for policymakers.
With regards to further research, it would be interesting to conduct the DCE eliciting
students’ job preferences in other European countries. Additionally, conducting a DCE
among young people who have been working for some years, would provide a good com-
parison between their stated preferences at the beginning of their careers and their revealed
preferences after having entered the labour market. Regarding the third chapter, the ex-
periment could be conducted in other Spanish cities, thus, increasing the sample size and
getting a more symmetric distribution of ideology, which could lead to a more precise es-
timation and richer interpretation. Lastly, in the fourth chapter, analyzing responses to
the lottery question in other Southern European countries would definitely provide a good
comparison to our findings in Spain, as rigorous studies on this topic are still missing in
Southern European countries.
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A2. Graphs of Distributions of Random Parameters. Incremental Marginal
Utilities.
Figure A1: Graphs of Distributions of Random Parameters for non-Spanish universities.
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Figure A2: Graphs of Distributions of Random Parameters for Spanish universities.
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B1. Experimental Procedures
Real-Effort Task
Participants in the real-effort task had to sort yellow and blue gravel into various containers
for seven minutes. There were two types of tasks the participants could have been asked to
do. In the “filling task”, participants received a tray with a clear container of mixed yellow
and blue gravel and small plastic pots. They were asked to put seven pieces of yellow
gravel and seven pieces of blue gravel in each small pot. In the “emptying task”, they
were given a tray with two empty clear containers and small plastic pots each containing
a mixture of blue and yellow gravel and had to empty the small pots sorting the gravel by
colour, putting the blue gravel in one of the clear containers and the yellow gravel in the
other. The emptying task can be viewed as preparation for the filling task and vice versa,
which enabled us to tell the participants in each session they were helping us prepare for
subsequent sessions by sorting out some materials. Therefore, participants were encouraged
to view their efforts as genuinely productive.
In the earned treatment, the initial endowments in the four-person dictator game were
determined by the participants’ rank in the real-effort task, determined by the number of
small pots they either filled or emptied. In determining the initial endowments in the second
part of the experiment, we decided to use rank instead of absolute numbers of pots for four
reasons. First of all, we assumed that participant types would vary with respect to their
ability and their willingness to exert effort in the real-effort task. If we had used absolute
numbers of pots instead of rank to determine initial endowments, the initial endowments
would have varied across types and we would not have been able to distinguish between
type and initial endowment effects. Second of all, participants’ willingness to exert effort
in the real-effort task might have varied by treatment, in which case we would have been
unable to distinguish between treatment and initial endowment effects. Third of all, if we
had used absolute numbers of pots to determine initial endowments, we would not have
been able to set up the four-person dictator game until the real-effort task had finished.
Setting up the initial endowments according to rank allowed us to save time by preparing
for the four-person dictator game beforehand. Finally, we conjectured that pot filling would
take longer than pot emptying and did not want initial endowments to depend on the task.
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The Four-Person Dictator Game
The four-person dictator game was conducted using specially designed and manufactured
trays. Each participant received a tray which was divided into four quadrants, each quad-
rant relating to a participant. The participant’s own quadrant was blue and located at the
side of the tray closest to the participant when the tray was placed on their desk in front of
him/her. Each quadrant contained black counters which represented the initial endowment
of the corresponding participant. One black counter was worth e 1. The participants were
told they could rearrange the counters any way they liked, as long as none of the counters
were removed from the tray. All instructions were given verbally in Spanish.
In addition to their final payoffs from the four-person dictator game, each participant
received a show-up fee of e 4. In the random treatment, the e 4 was presented as a flat fee
for the real-effort task. In the earned treatment, the e 4 was added to each of the possible
earnings levels and then set aside to be collected at the end of the session. Therefore, the
e 4 represented a minimum total final payoff for each participant.
B2. Selfishness
Measuring how participant i behaves with respect to himself/herself, using Model 1, allows
us to see the effect of left-right on selfishness. Table B1 displays the regression results,
which show that the triple interaction term is not statistically significantly different from
Table B1: Regression analysis of selfishness.
Dependent variable = participant i’s final allocation to himself/herself i
Full Sample Std. Error
Earned treatment (Ei) -0.028 (0.215)
i’s initial endowment (yi) -0.104 (0.564)
yi × Ei 0.088 (0.773)
left-right i 0.018 (0.038)
left-right i × Ei -0.031 (0.050)
yi× left-right i -0.025 (0.133)
yi× left-right i × Ei 0.160 (0.179)
Constant 0.414*** (0.158)
Observations 404
Participants 404
Notes: (i) Unit of analysis is an allocation by i to i; (ii) clustered standard errors at the
individual level; (iii) significance levels are indicated by: * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.001.
114
zero. Thus, a relationship between left-right and selfishness cannot be established.
B3. Sample Selection
Since we exclude participants who allocated zero to everyone other than themselves, we
need to verify that this does not pose a sample selection problem. Testing for sample
selection is done in two steps.
In the first step, we estimate the probability of being “selected”, si=1, referring to
participants who did not allocate zero to everyone other than themselves. This is estimated
using a logit model with all of the explanatory variables from Model 1, and also including
some sociodemographic variables: female, years of education, age, employment status,
and the proportion of right-wing voters in each postal code. Obtaining the estimated
coefficients, we compute the inverse Mills ratio for each individual:
λˆi = λ(ziγˆ).
where zi are the explanatory variables from the logit model and γˆ are all of the correspond-
ing estimated coefficients.
In the second step, we estimate our original model, Model 1, adding in the estimated
inverse Mills ratio:
xij 6=i = β0 + β1Ei + β2yj + β3(Ei × yj) + β4left− righti + β5(Ei × left− righti)
+ β6(yj × left− righti) + β7(Ei × yj × left− righti) + ρλˆi + εij .
We test the null hypothesis H0 : ρ = 0 using a t-statistic. The p-value obtained is 0.805
which indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level.
Therefore, there is no sample selection problem.
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B4. Linearity Tests
The model presented in Table 3.4, based on (3.1), is estimated assuming that the relation-
ship between participant j’s initial endowment and participant i’s final allocation to j is
linear. Furthermore, it also assumes linearity in the relationship between participant i’s
placement on the left-right scale and participant i’s final allocation to j. We tested both
of these assumptions.
Testing the first assumption, we estimated an unrestricted version of (3.1) and con-
ducted a linear restriction corresponding to the null hypothesis that the relationships are
linear in participant j’s initial endowment and the alternative hypothesis that they are not
linear. In the unrestricted model, participant j’s initial endowment is included as a set of
dummy variables, instead of as a single continuous variable, one corresponding to each of
the possible values that participant j’s initial endowment could take. Then, each of these
is interacted with E, left-right and E×left-right. An F-test indicates that the fit of the
unrestricted model is no better than the fit of the linear model (p-value=0.267).
Testing the second assumption, we were unable to estimate an unrestricted model similar
to the first, owing to small cell frequencies in the left-right variable. However, we estimated
an unrestricted model which included left-right2 as well as its interactions with E, yj and
E × yj. Once again, the F-test shows that the fit of the unrestricted model is no better
than the fit of the linear model (p-value=0.255).
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B5. Inclusion of Unemployed and Age as Controls
Table B2: Re-estimation of the effect of ideology on distributive preferences controlling for economic status.
Dependent variable = participant i’s final allocation to himself/herself i
Full Sample
Excluding Selfish Std. Error
Earned treatment (Ei) -0.075** (0.033)
i’s initial endowment (yi) -0.073 (0.086)
yi × Ei 0.218* (0.121)
left-right i -0.004 (0.005)
left-right i × Ei -0.005 (0.007)
yi× left-right i 0.006 (0.017)
yi× left-right i × Ei 0.035 (0.026)
Unemployedi -0.024 (0.017)
Unemployedi × Ei 0.069*** (0.025)
yi× Unemployedi 0.127** (0.054)
yi× Unemployedi × Ei -0.236*** (0.086)
Constant 0.231*** (0.023)
Observations 1092
Participants 364
Notes: (i) Unit of analysis is an allocation by i to i; (ii) clustered standard errors at the
individual level; (iii) significance levels are indicated by: * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.001.
Table B3: Re-estimation of the effect of ideology on distributive preferences controlling for age.
Dependent variable = participant i’s final allocation to himself/herself i
Student
Sample Std. Error
Earned treatment (Ei) -0.066 (0.052)
i’s initial endowment (yi) -0.166 (0.120)
yi × Ei 0.108 (0.189)
left-right i -0.002 (0.005)
left-right i × Ei -0.010 (0.013)
yi× left-right i 0.004 (0.016)
yi× left-right i × Ei 0.073* (0.039)
Agei 0.011** (0.005)
Agei × Ei -0.004 (0.006)
yi× Agei -0.027 (0.017)
yi× Agei × Ei 0.025 (0.023)
Constant 0.276*** (0.027)
Observations 297
Participants 99
Notes: (i) Unit of analysis is an allocation by i to i; (ii) clustered standard errors at the
individual level; (iii) significance levels are indicated by: * p≤0.10, ** p≤0.05, *** p≤0.001.
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